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Okinawa serves as a strategic base for U.S. forces in maintaining regional security 
and protecting Japanese and American interests based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States and its 1951 predecessor.  
This thesis assesses the developing factors in Japan’s constitutional debate after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  It examines the myriad issues influencing the 
reinterpretation or potential revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution and what 
implications revision would have on Japan-based U.S. forces stationed primarily in 
Okinawa. 
This thesis argues that Tokyo’s reinterpretation or revision of Article 9 of Japan’s 
constitution would not require a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Okinawa.  
Regional threats still validate the half-century old U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and most 
of its current structure. The major questions the thesis addresses are how and why Japan 
is reinterpreting or may revise  its constitution, what dangers threaten Japanese and  
American  security and interests, and how Okinawa’s bases contribute to the security and 
stability of the region and at what price.  Furthermore, this thesis evaluates the validity of 
perceptions regarding U.S. troops on Okinawa, and it seeks to clarify the situation on 
Okinawa.   
 This thesis’ arguments set the stage for a policy-prescriptive conclusion which is 
predicated on six individual premises. A major point is the validation of a viable and 
proven U.S. expeditionary force to remain stationed within Japan.  Also, it offers 
practical recommendations for what is next for U.S. forces on Okinawa, including 
maintaining the status quo with certain adjustments, overhauling public relations and 
media interactions, and examining the merits of Kadena Air Base and Ie Island for the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS QUESTION 
The year 2004 marks the 150th anniversary of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s 
conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 thereby accomplishing the mandate of 
U.S. President Millard Fillmore to “open” Japan.  It is ironic that in 2004 the issues of 
1854 revisit Japan and dominate debate within the power circles of Tokyo today.  The 
issues are eerily reminiscent and echo the concerns of the former Tokugawa shogunate--
Japan’s security and future.  Today, Japan is rethinking how it participates in its own 
defense and its place in the international community.  Japan’s options in addressing these 
concerns are what the debates focus on, and they start with revising the half-century old 
pacifist constitution.  
Japan’s constitution has never been amended to reflect changes in Japanese 
society since its adoption in 1946.  Revising the constitution--specifically Article 9 which 
renounces war and prohibits Japan in exercising collective defense-- is a course which the 
incumbent Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi advocates.  Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War 13 years ago, polls indicate that the Japanese, as a 
nation, express the need to revise their constitution in order to adequately provide for 
their own defense in the post-September 11, 2001 or 9/11 world (see Appendix A).   
The debate on constitutional revision and related issues such as the deployment of 
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to Iraq has commanded Japan’s attention for quite 
some time now.  The ruling party, opposition parties and polling data indicate that the 
Japanese are ready to revise their 58 year-old constitution but how far and in what 
direction are pending questions.  In April 2004, the kidnapping and subsequent release of 
five Japanese civilians by terrorists in Iraq tested Japan’s resolve to stay the course and 
act as a world power.  This delicate debate and fragile resolve regarding constitutional 
revision could recoil quickly should things go bad for the Japanese, such as the killing of 
JSDF members in Iraq.  The lynchpin in the constitutional debate is the threat to Japan 
and to the stability of East Asia.  As the debate progresses, the United States listens 
attentively as it transforms the Department of Defense (DoD) and wrestles with finding 
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the best force structure to address future threats and contribute to the security of Japan 
and the stability of East Asia.    
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the developing factors in Japan’s 
constitutional debate that will affect the future U.S. presence on Okinawa.  Its hypothesis 
is that Tokyo’s future reinterpretation or revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution will 
not invalidate the presence of U.S. forces on Okinawa.  Regional threats with potential 
instability and a limited JSDF vindicates the half-century old U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance and most of its current structure. The major questions it addresses are how and 
why Japan is reinterpreting its constitution, what dangers threaten United States and 
Japanese security and interests, and how Okinawa’s bases contribute to the security and 
stability of the region and at what price.  This thesis assesses the proposition that the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 fueled the current drive to put talk into action and that 
regional threats have increased the momentum.  Additionally, this thesis evaluates the 
validity of perceptions regarding U.S. troops on Okinawa, and it seeks to clarify the 
situation on Okinawa.  
B. RELEVANCE OF TOPIC 
This topic is important to Japanese and American interests since Okinawa serves 
as a strategic base for U.S. forces in maintaining regional security and stability.  Thirteen 
years after the end of the Cold War several current and mid-range threats to regional 
security and stability are present that must be addressed.  As the U.S. military 
contemplates reshuffling its forces in South Korea and other places around the globe, care 
must be taken to follow the evolution of Japan’s constitutional debate so that the bulk of 
U.S. forces in Japan, stationed on Okinawa, are not rendered ineffective and create a 
power vacuum in East Asia to be filled by a hostile power.   
C. METHOLOGY 
This thesis’ arguments set the stage for a policy-prescriptive conclusion.  The 
basic methodology uses a case studies process in tracing past and current geopolitical, 
social, and military trends and events.  To assess the validity of the hypothesis the 
evidence derives from a variety of professional academic writings, journalistic literature, 
government sources and interviews of key figures.  The thesis builds on Naval 
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Postgraduate School graduate Major Stephen E. Duke’s June 2001 thesis, Japan’s 
Constitution, Prospects for Change: Impact on U.S. Presence in Japan.  His thesis serves 
as a backdrop for an assessment of events and trends that have shaped policy in Japan 
since September 2001, focusing on the implications of the reinterpretation or revision of 
the Japanese Constitution for U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa.  In part, this thesis draws 
on my experience as an U.S. Marine stationed on Okinawa for nine years in various 
billets, ranging from key leadership positions as a military policeman to aide de camp for 
the Commanding General of Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I opens with an overview of the thesis argument and explains the 
methology of the thesis. 
Chapter II provides the background of the thesis, using Major Stephen E. Duke’s 
June 2001 thesis, Japan’s Constitution, Prospects for Change: Impact on U.S. Presence 
in Japan as the starting point.  From there this chapter addresses key facts, events, and 
trends since September 2001 and focuses on the implications of the reinterpretation or 
revision of the Japanese Constitution towards Okinawa.  This chapter concentrates on 
events after September 2001 as they affect the security alliance between Japan and the 
United States.  This chapter also examines Japan’s defense program and the forces behind 
constitutional change and, the key events and timelines associated with this issue.  
Furthermore, this chapter also examines U. S. policy and cooperation with the Japanese 
participating in their own security and trends encouraging Japan to become a more 
“normal nation.”     
Chapter III is an in-depth analysis of the “burden” of Okinawa.  The goal of this 
chapter is to provide an objective picture of local sentiment on Okinawa regarding U.S. 
forces based there.  The chapter provides a cursory review of the history of Okinawa 
since World War II and elucidates misperceptions that have formed about the U.S. 
military.  Finally, the chapter highlights the prefectural political machine’s activities and 
media attacks on the U.S. military.   
Chapter IV seeks to frame accurately the current and mid-range threats to Japan’s 
and the United States’ security and interests in the region that validates a strong security 
alliance and shapes it for the future.  This chapter focuses on potential belligerents and 
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the menacing actions on the Korean Peninsula as well as the growing influence of the 
People’s Republic of China which poses a potential long range threat and also influences 
the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Other potential flash points, such as the Taiwan 
Straits, are examined.  The chapter assesses these both from the perspective of the U.S.-
Japan alliance and then from that of potential adversaries’.  Chapter IV concludes by 
assessing the need for a strong U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the remedy to these 
threats.      
Chapter V draws on the preceding analysis to propose the way ahead.  A major 
point is the validation of a viable and proven U.S. expeditionary force to remain stationed 
within Japan.  Essentially, this chapter attempts to answer the question posed frequently 
by Deputy Commander of United States Forces Japan (USFJ), Brigadier General 
Timothy Larsen, “what’s next?” It offers practical recommendations for what is next for 
U.S. forces on Okinawa, including status quo with certain policy adjustments, 
overhauling public relations and media interactions, and examining the merits of Kadena 




II. REVELATIONS OF A CHANGING CONSTITUTION 
A. DESCRIBING THE MOOD 
What tends to happen both in Japan and in the United States is that the dangers 
that threaten the freedom both nations enjoy, and how that freedom was obtained and 
sustained, are easily forgotten.  An analogy of a police department in any town or city in 
the United States combating crime hammers this point home.  As the citizenry of a 
community demands swift action to stem a rise in crime, local government leaders listen 
attentatively to the needs of its police force to combat the unacceptable levels of crime.  
Budgets are redrafted and the crime-fighting authorities are provided with a full range of 
resources which, over time, yield the intended results and the praise of the citizenry for 
the success of the police for bringing crime levels down to unprecedented levels.  As the 
public becomes comfortable in the stability of low crime levels, attention drifts to other 
community issues which become the focus of the local leaders.  Here is where the 
problem begins.  Police officials are forced to justify their budgets and are inherently 
handicapped by being unable to quantify their services.  At the end of the day, the typical 
police department does not produce a product.  It cannot stand proud next to an item and 
say, “this is what we produced with the taxpayer’s dollars.”   It is nearly impossible to 
quantify all the crime that was deterred or the incidents that were made less severe had 
the police not been there.  The police are ipso facto put on the defensive and find 
themselves on a slippery slope down towards budget cuts.  The funds that once helped 
them combat crime are now put into other priorities within the community and after time, 
crime rates gradually go up again. 
This is essentially what is happening in Japan among the voting public with 
regards to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, primarily on Okinawa.  The problem is that 
both nations cannot gamble the analogous scenario at a national level.  This argument 
should not be looked upon as the U.S. military being the “police force.”  More accurately, 
the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is the “police force” and the U.S. military is one of the 
many budgetary items.  This force continues to maintain stability and deterrence in the 
region and makes potential adversaries pause before acting aggressively, such as on the 
Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Straits. 
6 
                                                
B. 9/11 SHAPES THE ENVIRONMENT 
Commodore Perry’s arrival into Edo Bay (Tokyo Bay) in 1853 sparked what 
became known as the Meiji Restoration, which officially began in 1868.  The arrival of 
Perry’s “black ships” began a period during which Japan wrestled with its policy of 
sakoku or seclusion and its inferior technology that could not resist Western imperialism, 
which was carving up parts of East Asia in the mid-19th century and that led to the 
imposition of unequal treaties upon Japan by the United States in 1854 by Perry and 
again in 1858 with the American Counsel Townsend Harris.  Once Japan found its 
direction, it sought to modernize by adopting Western technology, reorganizing its 
society, and changing its structural norms in order to prevent further unequal treaties and 
protect its sovereignty. 1
The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent United States led global 
war on terrorism seem to have put Japan in a position similar to that brought about by  
Perry 150 years ago.  Just as Perry’s arrival forced Japan to deal with tough issues, 9/11 
has forced Japan to debate and assess its future global role as an economic superpower, a 
position in which it cannot assert its political power without contributing more than just 
cash.  The effects of 9/11 have caused the United States to accelerate the transformation 
of the U.S. military and to ask Japan to participate more in its own defense and the U.S.-
Japan Security Alliance by sharing more risk.   
Revising the Japanese Constitution is not a new issue and has been a subject of 
debate for many years in Japan.  The consequences of 9/11 and the breach of the 1994 
Agreed Framework by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2002 
changed the importance of this issue and reinvigorated the debate process in Japan, 
becoming the source of pressure for the Japanese to reconcile their ambiguous position 
with regard to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as articulated in the previous section. 
Prior to the terrorist actions on September 11, 2001, Stephen E. Duke argued that, 
“…it is not a matter of if but when Japan will revise its current peace constitution to 
revise Article 9 and make Japan a normal nation capable of collective defense and 
 
 1 Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius Jansen, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 80. 
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meeting the responsibilities of a true alliance.”2  Duke assessed political and domestic 
trends shaping the debate of constitutional revision in Japan.  The following sections and 
chapters assesses the effects since September 11, 2001 and focuses on the implications 
for U.S. forces on Okinawa, where 60 percent of U.S. forces in Japan are based.3  
C. CALCULATING NATIONAL DIRECTIONS 
1. Background on Japan’s Constitutional Debate and Defense Issues 
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Japan experienced a backlash from the 
international community, which expected more assistance from the economic giant in 
defeating Saddam Hussein’s army.  Japan eventually contributed 13 billion U.S. dollars4 
to the war effort but realized that this contribution was looked upon as checkbook 
diplomacy and was not what the world expected from the second largest economic 
power.  Criticism of Japan’s role in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War first stunned the 
Japanese public for the lack of appreciation by the world community.  But it also caused 
the Japanese to realize that they enjoyed a security blanket and prosperous way of life 
that they were not required to defend with Japanese blood.5   
This realization in Japanese society caused the Government of Japan (GOJ) to 
study how it could participate in and contribute to in global affairs commensurate to its 
economic power.  The result was a review on the restrictions of the Japanese 
Constitution, specifically Article 9, which states:  
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based in justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
 
 2 Stephen E. Duke, Major, USMC, “Japan’s Constitution, Prospects For Change: Impact on U.S. 
Presence in Japan” (MA. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 2.  
       3 There are roughly 45,000 U.S. military personnel and 54,600 civilian personnel and family members 
based in Japan under the sub-unified command of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), subordinate to U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM).  Of that, about 27,000 military personnel or 60% and, 26,000 family members and 
U.S. civilian employees are based in Okinawa.  This information is compiled from various Department of 
Defense websites and from http://usfj.mil; Internet;  accessed 12 August 2004.  These calculations are 
corroborated by Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG), see OPG. OPG Online [home page on-line]; 
available from  http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=589&page=1; Internet; 
accessed 23 July 2004.   
4 Katsumi Ishizuka, “The Evolution of Japan’s Policy Towards UN Peace Operations, “ presented at 
the Fifteenth Annual Meeting for the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), at 
Cascais, Portugal, 21-23 June 2002, 10. 
5 MOFA, “Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,” 
MOFA Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html; 
Internet; accessed 23 July 2004. 
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and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.6   
After decades of living under this constitution, many Japanese had been 
effectively pacified and did not believe in their right to exercise collective defense, 
thereby espousing a pacifist position.  Recognizing that Japan’s political and diplomatic 
role in world affairs could be marginalized should it continue with the image of 
checkbook diplomacy, the GOJ convened a commission, “the Ozawa Commission,” to 
study the issue and recommend a way ahead.7    
Japan’s ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)) chairman at the time, 
Ichiro Ozawa, favored allowing the JSDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations (UN PKO) and interpreted the Japanese Constitution as not prohibiting the 
Japan Self-Defense Forces from such missions, citing the constitution’s preamble; “…we 
shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all 
nations…”8  The result was the International Peace Cooperation Bill, also known as the 
peacekeeping operations bill or “PKO Bill,” which was passed into law by the Japanese 
Diet in June 1992 and gave the “legal authority for the JSDF to participate in all UN 
peacekeeping operations.”9  Since 1992, the JSDF has been actively involved in UN PKO 
missions, starting with the dispatch of an engineer battalion to Cambodia for the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).10  Since then, the JSDF has 
participated in about ten UN PKO missions throughout the world in places such as 
Central America, the Middle East, Africa, India and elsewhere.   
During the 1990’s, Japanese financial contributions along with participation in 
UN PKO missions may have been acceptable for the international community 
considering the constraints of the Japanese Constitution.  But internal debate on the 
restrictions of Article 9 did not fade away.  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
 
6 Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (New York, NY: Ronald Press, 1955), 493. 
7 Ishizuka, 11. 
8 Borton, 490. 
9 Ishizuka, 13. 
10 Takeo Yamaoka, Colonel, JGSDF, “Brief on Japan Ground Self Defense Force Operation in Iraq,” 
Washington, DC, 12 May 2004.  
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campaigned on the issue of constitutional revision among other major issues concerning 
the Japanese in 2001 and again in 2004.  After 9/11 and the subsequent United States led 
global war on terrorism, the constraints of the Japanese Constitution became a 
dominating issue in Japan and between the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. 
2. Japan Participating in its Own Security? 
As Duke professed, “it is not a matter of if but when Japan will revise or 
reinterpret its constitution to authorize Japanese forces to participate in collective 
defense.”11  This is what essentially occurred in July 2003, when the Japanese Diet 
passed a series of special measures bills allowing the JSDF to participate in the United 
States led, not just United Nations led, global war on terrorism in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF).  Although the JSDF is limited to overseas development assistance 
(ODA) missions, this reinterpretation of the constitution was a colossal step forward for 
Japan as it allowed Japanese forces to deploy outside Japan without UN sponsorship for 
the first time since 1945.12          
In the aftermath of 9/11, Prime Minister Koizumi’s efforts to promote 
constitutional revision picked up steam and engendered the LDP Research Commission 
on the constitution.  Other political parties in Japan have joined in, establishing their own 
constitutional research teams.  Polls indicate that the Japanese are ready to revise the 
constitution, specifically Article 9, but polls also indicate that governmental institutions 
may be going faster than the public is prepared to go (see Appendix A).  The military 
attaché at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, points out the 
paradox that up until the 1990’s Japan was extremely slow in evolving its defense policy 
 
11 Duke, v. 
12 The JSDF provided logistical assistance to U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
in Afghanistan under a different agreement called the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). 
The ACSA sets forth a framework concerning the reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the 
Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. Armed Forces. The ACSA, previous to the revised April 2004, 
applied to bilateral exercises and training, United Nations peacekeeping operations, humanitarian 
international relief operations and operations in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The 
amended ACSA of April 2004 version, applies to a wider range of activities, such as (1) operations in 
armed attack situations or situations in which an armed attack is expected, and (2) operations to further the 
efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security and to cope with 
large-scale disasters or for other purposes. The provision of supplies and services by the Self-Defense 
Forces of Japan requires a domestic legal basis for each of its activities.  See MOFA. MOFA Online [home 
page on-line]; available from  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2004/2/0227.html; Internet; accessed 
23 July 2004. 
and focused on its fast running economy--what he explained as “the tortoise” (defense 
policy) and “the hare” (the economy).  However, since the adoption of the “PKO law” in 
1992, the growing nuclear weapon threat of North Korea since 2002, the threat of 
terrorism after 9/11 with the subsequent passing of the anti-terrorism Special Measures 
Law in July 2003, and passage of the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq 
Law in December 2003, coupled with the downturn of the Japanese economy in the 
1990’s, the “hare” has now become defense policies and the “tortoise” is the economy.13   
These advances in defense issues may be too fast for the Japanese public to adjust 
to.  The Self-Defense Forces are attempting to help the public catch up by gaining their 
attention and educating them on military and defense matters.  Years of the public not 
paying attention to defense issues have caused some turbulence, as polls show that the 
Japanese demonstrated some ambivalence regarding the dispatch of JSDF personnel to 
Iraq (see Table 1) and the risks in defense of Japanese interests (see Table 2).  
Furthermore, Table 3 suggests a split in the Japanese public to fight and defend their 
country should a threat manifest within or towards the Japanese home islands; evidence 
that generations of Japanese who have grown and lived under a “peace constitution” for 
over a half a century has had interesting effects.  
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Table 1. Polls in Support or Not in Support of the SDF Dispatch to Iraq 
    
From:  Compiled by author from various sources as noted below, June 2004.14
 
13 Takeo Yamaoka, Colonel, Military Attaché, at the Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC, interview 
by author, 12 May 2004.   
14 December 2003, taken and reported by the Mainichi Shimbun on 26 January 2004.  First set of January 2004 
data, taken by the Yomiuri Shimbun in a Japan nationwide face-to-face public opinion survey conducted 24-25 January 
Table 2. Should the SDF Withdraw if Casualties are Sustained in Iraq 
 
 
              From:  Compiled by author from various sources as noted below, September 2004.15  
 
 










If Japan were attacked, do you feel you have a moral duty 
to fight to defend your country, or do you not feel this 
way? 
 
Have moral duty to fight 47% 
Do not feel this way  30 
Don’t know  23 
  From:  James S. Marshall, “An End to Japanese Pacifism?” Issued by the Office 
  of Research, Department of State, 20 August 2003, 1. 
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2004 and reported on 27 January 2004.  Second set of January 2004 data, taken by the Mainichi Shimbun in a 
telephone-based public opinion survey on 24-25 January 2004 and reported on 26 January 2004.  February 2004, taken 
by Kyodo News on 6-7 February 2004 in a telephone-based opinion survey across the Japan and reported in the Tokyo 
Shimbun on 8 February 2004.  March 2004, conducted on 6-7 March 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey 
with the aim of calling a total of 1,000 voters across Japan on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. 
Answers were obtained from 1,070 persons and reported in the Mainichi Shimbun on 8 March 2004.  June 2004, 
conducted 12-13 June 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of calling a total of 1,000 voters 
across Japan on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis.  Answers were obtained from 1,054 persons and 
reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 15 June 04. 
15 February 2004, taken by Kyodo News on 6-7 February 2004 in a telephone-based opinion survey across Japan  
and reported in the Tokyo Shimbun on 8 February 2004.  March 2004, conducted on 6-7 March 2004 in  a  
telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of calling a total of 1,000 voters across the Japan on a  
computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis.  Answers were obtained from 1,070 persons and reported in  
the Mainichi Shimbun on 8 March 2004. September 2004 survey was conducted September 27-28 over the  
telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. This RDD formula chose people for the survey  
from among all eligible voters throughout Japan on a three-stage random-sampling basis. Effective answers were  
obtained from 972 persons (55 percent) and reported Asahi Shimbun on 29 September 2004. 
Table 1 is closely related to Japanese public support for Prime Minister Koizumi 
(see Table 4), which explains the LDP’s tenuous ability to stay in power after the July 11, 
2004 Upper House elections, in which the LDP lost a seat and the main opposition party, 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) or Minshuto, gained twelve seats.16  Table 4 
demonstrates Koizumi’s waning support on domestic issues such as slow pension or 
social security reform in an aging society, scandals within his cabinet, and other issues 
such as security.  The LDP does not maintain a majority in the Japanese Diet, but 
Koizumi is able to keep his post thanks to the coalition the LDP has with the New 
Komeito party.  After weathering two elections, Koizumi has expressed confidence about 
continuing his reforms in several press briefings.  
 
Table 4. Polls Demonstrating Support for Prime Minister Koizumi’s Cabinet 
From:  Compiled by author from various sources as noted below, September 2004.17
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16 Mainichi (Tokyo), 12 July 2004. 
17 December 2003, taken by the Yomiuri Shimbun in a nationwide (Japan) face-to-face public opinion survey 
conducted between 13-14 December 2004, and reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 27 January 2004.    27 January 
2004 taken by the Yomiuri Shimbun in a nationwide (Japan) face-to-face public opinion survey conducted between 13-
14 December 2004, and reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 27 January 2004.  February 2004, taken by Kyodo News 
on 6-7 February 2004 in a telephone-based opinion survey across Japan and reported in the Tokyo Shimbun on 8 
February 2004.  March 2004, conducted on 6-7 March 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of 
calling a total of 1,000 voters across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were 
obtained from 1,070 persons and reported in the Mainichi Shimbun on 8 March 2004.  15 June 2004, conducted 12-13 
June 2004 in a face-to-face public opinion survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and reported in the Yomiuri 
Shimbun on 15 June 2004.  5 July 2004, conducted by Nikkei Research between 30 June and 4 July 2004 by telephone.  
The poll targeted all males and females, 20 years-old and over, across Japan, on a computer-aided random digit dialing 
(RDD) basis or otherwise on a telephone directory sampling (TDS) basis.  On an RDD basis, a total of 9,055 
households with one or more eligible voters were called in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Osaka, Fukuoka, and 
Okinawa, and answers were obtained from 4,919 persons or 54.3 percent.  On the TDS basis, a total of 29,900 persons 
13 
                                                
Although polls indicate that the Japanese are ready for constitutional revision, 
“the Japanese Diet has not clearly identified Japanese national security interests and how 
they are to be ensured, due primarily to the schism between conservatives and leftists 
over basic national policies during the Cold War.”18  Koizumi’s narrow victory in July 
2004 and the decline of support in his cabinet and its efforts towards reforms may prove 
to stall the constitutional revision effort.  The issue of revising the constitution, especially 
Article 9, will not go away, however.  Lessons from the experience of the global war on 
terrorism are already being examined by the Japanese. 
In 2003, Koizumi directed the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to review the 
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).19 The purpose of the NDPO20 is to prescribe 
a defense policy for Japan taking into account the current international context for 
preserving the sovereignty and peace of Japan in accordance with the constitution and the 
“three non-nuclear principles.”21  The motive for reviewing Japan’s defense is to assess 
and adjust its capabilities to deal with terrorists and ballistic missiles.  Anything more 
will more than likely require a revision of the constitution or, as was done in 2003, a 
reinterpretation of the constitution followed by the introduction of special measures laws. 
The Japanese Diet, the LDP and the opposition parties have all established 
research commissions to draft proposals for revision of the constitution.  Even the private 
sector has taken interest in constitutional revision. Groups such as the Japanese Business 
 
were chosen in other prefectures, and answers were obtained from 14,046 persons or 47 percent.   Aug 2004, taken by 
the Jiji Press released on 13 August 2004 and reported in the Tokyo Shimbun on 14 August 2004.  The survey was 
conducted between August 6-9, 2004.  A total of 1,000 persons were chosen from among all males and females, aged 
20 and over, across Japan.  The effective retrieval rate was 71.2 percent.  6 September 2004, conducted 2-5 September 
2004 by Nihon Keizai and reported on 6 September 2004.   
         
18 Hideki Yamaji, “Future Japanese Security Policies: Contending Approaches,” in Brookings 
Northeast Asia Survey 2003-2004, eds. Richard C. Bush, Sharon Yanagi, and Kevin Scott (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 32.          
 19 Asahi (Tokyo), 18 March 2004. 
 20 JDA, “National Defense Program Outline,” JDA Online [home page on-line]; available from  
http://www.jda.co.jp/e/policy/f_work/f_work_.htm; Internet; accessed 6 April 2004. 
 21 In 1976, The Japanese Government signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and officially 
declared the adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, introduced by Prime Minister Sato during his 
premiership between 1968-1972, which refers to the principles of  “not possessing nuclear weapons, not 
producing them and not permitting their introduction in Japan.”  Han Jiang asserts in Beijing’s Zhongguo 
Guofang Bao 13 April 2004 article titled, “Is Japan Allowing US Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier To 
Enter Its Port ?” that  Japan may be signaling its willingness to abandon its Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
due to the presumed introduction of the nuclear-powered CVN-77, USS George Bush to the 7th Fleet based 
in Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay as the USS Kitty Hawk’s replacement in 2008.   
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Federation (Keidanren) have inaugurated study groups.  The key controversial issue is 
Article 9 of the constitution, which Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage stated 
has become an obstacle22 for Japan to use military power to provide for its collective 
defense23 and become a more “normal country.” 24  The slow and deliberate bottom-up 
decision-making process25 intrinsic of Japan has manifested in the process of 
constitutional revision.  The absence of a revised constitution is prohibiting the 
government from adopting a strategic roadmap with regards to becoming a “normal 
country” by shaping its military for providing for its collective defense.  Japan holds the 
initiative in this regard while the United States searches for the best recipe in terms of 
force structure in East Asia, anticipating a unified Korea, peacefully or forcefully, and a 
revised Japanese Constitution.  Chapter V contains options for the governments of Japan 
and the United States to adopt with respect to the U.S. force structure in Japan.   
3. The Pentagon’s Transformation and its Relationship to Japan 
Transformation in DoD is not new.  However, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfield institutionalized it shortly after President Bush took office in January 2001 and 
directed a bottom-up review of DoD.  The U.S. Army, under General Shinseki’s26 
leadership took a progressive approach towards transforming its “heavy” divisions, built 
for fighting the Soviet Army in the European theater, into lighter expeditionary brigades.  
The Air Force also looked at becoming more expeditionary and had already developed 
stealth aircraft, among other initiatives, which have been shaping the battlefield for years 
now.  The Navy and Marine Corps have been leading the way in transforming 
capabilities that are based on the requirements of anticipated future missions.  Shortly 
 
 22 Bungei Shunju, (Washington, DC) Richard Armitage interviewed by Yoshio Hotta, March 2004. 
 23 In accordance with international law, collective defense is the right to use force to stop armed attack 
on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. 
See, JDA, “National Defense Program Outline,” JDA Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.jda.co.jp/e/policy/f_work/f_work_.htm; Internet; accessed 6 April 2004.   
 24 The term was first used by Ichiro Ozawa and refers to the division of labor in economic terms.  This 
term has mutated in meaning as occidentals have used it in various ways to describe Japan’s international 
and political situation.  Takehiro Funakoshi, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Japan 
Washington, DC stated during an interview on 12 May 2004 that officially, the Government of Japan has 
never used the term “normal country” since it has never considered itself abnormal. 
 25 Gregory R. Tenhover, Unlocking the Japanese Business Mind (Washington, DC: Transemantics, 
1994), 126. 
 26 Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army under President Clinton and Secretaries of Defense William 
Perry and William Cohen. 
15 
                                                
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DoD released its report on the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which advocates more of a capabilities-based, 
joint-operating military.27   
The 2001 QDR shifts away from the 1997 QDR strategy of fighting two major  
theater wars (MTW)28 and synergizes all the prior efforts of the armed forces to 
transform in accordance with one roadmap and places tasks and goals for each service on 
four pillars--strengthening joint operations, experimenting with new approaches to 
warfare, exploiting U.S. intelligence, and developing transformational capabilities 
through increased and wide-ranging science and technology.29   Prior to this, the services 
had their own ideas on how to transform and struggled with breaking the old school of 
large land armies built to fight a rival superpower in favoring lighter, task-organized 
units.30   Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfield raised the stakes by challenging each of the 
services to structure themselves to deploy to a distant theater in 10 days, defeat an enemy 
within 30 days, and be ready for an additional fight within another 30 days, yielding 
Rumsfield’s “10-30-30” objective.31   
The groundwork for establishing broader national direction was laid in the 
September 17, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  In it, the 
President outlined America’s international strategy, commitment to work with other 
nations to defuse regional conflicts, and echoed the transformation of DoD and other 
 
 27 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense (Washington, DC) 30 September 
2001, 13. 
 28 Charles M. Perry and Toshi Yoshihara, The U.S-Japan Alliance: Preparing for Korean 
Reconciliation and Beyond (Everett, MA: Brassey’s, 2003), 167. 
 29 Ibid., 32. 
 30 As an observer at the U.S. Army Transformation War Game (ATWG) held at the U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., between 22-26 April 2002, I took note of top ranking U.S. Army 
leadership from various commands such as Training and Doctrine Command  (TRADOC) Commanding 
General, General Abrams and others, and many retired generals invited as senior mentors, wrestle and 
passionately debate over what priorities the Army must take to transform and to what it must transform into 
in order to meet the future needs of the United States.   Marine representatives interpreted the Army’s 
approach as a clear challenge to the Marine Corps, as the Army sought to become light and expeditionary 
and tied to more naval capabilities as the Marines.  Additionally, Marine representatives witnessed the lack 
of buy-in from the Air Force to transform to meet the Army’s future airlift requirements.  
 31 Jason Sherman, “Rumsfeild’s New Speed Goals: U.S. Services Must Deploy, Win, Recover More 
Quickly,” Defense News, 12 April 2004. 
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national security institutions to meet the threats of the twenty-first century.32    In these 
two documents, the United States is set for the course Washington will take. 33  This may 
assist the Japanese in finding their own way toward developing a strategic outlook for its 
own defense, which may include the reinterpretation or revision of their constitution.        
When assessing the transformation of DoD and its implications for the 
constitutional debate in Japan and for the JSDF, other issues must be considered.  Most 
notable is the disproportional distribution of U.S. forces in Japan, specifically in the 47th 
prefecture of Japan--Okinawa.  Chapter III will lay out the details of the unequal 
distribution of forces on Okinawa and the burden assumed by the Okinawans.  In an April 
2004 visit to Japan, Vice President Richard Cheney stated:   
The United States is considering transforming its forces on the global 
scale.   U.S. forces might be realigned in the next several years.  We 
would like to give consideration to the sentiments of residents (near U.S. 
bases in Japan), who are eager to end the friction.34   
This is not a new policy for the United States with respect to its forces in 
Okinawa, as the December 2, 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final 
Report did exactly what the Vice President said.  However, this now indicates that U.S. 
forces throughout all of Japan will not be excluded from the DoD global transformation 
in spite of the slow progress in Japan’s constitutional debate.  All units and bases will be 
reviewed.   
Finally, another issue closely related to the DoD transformation process is the 
base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, which is influenced by the Pentagon’s 
Integrated Global Posture Basing Study (IGPBS).  BRAC originally focused on military 
bases within the United States without regard to the outcome of the IGPBS.  But, it was 
later determined that BRAC decisions relative to U.S. military bases could and should not 
                                                 
32 The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 
2002. The White House Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.thewhitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html; Internet; accessed 1 July 2004. 
33 In 2004 the Secretary of Defense released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States 
of America which contained the goals and objectives of the 2001 QDR and the President’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America.  On 13 May 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff released the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America which provides 
guidance on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States of America and serves to 
implement the Secretary of Defense’s NDS.  
34 Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 14 April 2004. 
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be made without knowledge of future world-wide positioning of forces.  The IGPBS is a 
study of how DoD should be positioned and structured overseas.  Specifically IGPBS was 
engendered to determine what should be CONUS-based and what should be forward 
deployed.35   
According to Christopher Johnstone, country director for Japan, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), bringing these two national processes together officially 
commenced in December 2002 with the “2 plus 2”36 meeting and the subsequent 
informal talks dubbed the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI).  These informal 
bilateral talks provide a five-phase structure for Japanese and U.S. officials to share ideas 
on how the alliance should proceed.  The details of the process are not public, but the 
phases consist of, first, reviewing strategic developments in Asia and ensuring that both 
sides agree with the current situation; second, a discussion of roles and missions in 
context of the alliance; third, a discussion of military force structure in Japan (U.S. and 
Japanese); fourth, a discussion of bases; and lastly, a discussion of managing local issues 
with local communities.   At the time of this writing, the bilateral talks are in phase 
three.37  (See Appendix B for a diagram on how these national transformational processes 
are related). 
4. Tailoring Transformation for U.S. Forces in Asia 
At of the time of this writing, evidence of U.S. forces transforming in Asia 
includes the announcement of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division moving further 
south, away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and away from North Korean artillery 
 
35Brigadier General W.J. Williams, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics 
(Facilities), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, during an interview by author, 
Washington, DC, on 14 May 2004, stated that much of BRAC analysis should be completed prior to the 
U.S. Presidential election in November 2004 but the approval of the outcome and the follow-on process 
may be contingent on the election should a new administration take office.  Additionally, BGen Williams 
indicates that the Pentagon is experiencing “push back” from the Congress who believes that due to the 
current war of terrorism and other pressures and world events, the U.S should not engage in the BRAC 
process at this time; however, DoD believes that there is excess physical capacity with regards to bases and 
facilities and wishes to conduct the BRAC process to better transform DoD and efficiently use existing 
bases, facilities, and structure.  
36 “2 plus 2” refers to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State meeting with Japan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director General of the Japan Defense Agency.  
37 Christopher Johnstone, Country Director for Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The 
Pentagon, Washington, DC, during an interview by author, Washington, DC, on 13 May 2004. 
18 
                                                
range in the Republic of Korea.38  Additionally, other indications are the relocating of the 
U.S. Army’s First Corps from Fort Louis, Washington to Camp Zama, Kanagawa 
Prefecture, Japan and a possible realignment of the command structure at USFJ. 39   
In proposing options to DoD for U.S. force structure in Asia, specifically in 
Japan, in accordance with the 2001 QDR and the national security strategy, it is important 
to identify the factors which influence changes in Asia.  Perry and Yoshihara have 
identified four main factors.  First, “any U.S. involvement in a high-intensity conflict 
would severely strain America’s ability to fulfill its other commitments.” Second, “the 
possibility that adversaries could attempt to deny U.S. military access to overseas bases 
and forward-deployed forces will become an increasingly [complicated] problem.” Third, 
“the emergence of the Asia-Pacific region as a principal theater of operations…will play 
a major role in shaping the Pentagon’s new strategy.” Fourth, “the operational 
environment in which U.S. forces will be fighting in the twenty-first century will be 
radically different from that of the Cold War era.”40  I would add a fifth: U.S. forces 
stationed overseas, particularly in Asia where young Americans are not as culturally or 
ethnically familiar with the Japanese and other regional countries, as they are with 
Europe, must adopt a fundamental change in how they operate and contribute to the 
community of their host nation.   All of these strategies and factors must be part of the 
formula for reaching the best options for U.S. military presence in Japan. 
D. EQUAL BURDEN-SHARING EQUALS RECIPORCITY  
There are many variables which the Japanese are considering in the debates about 
constitutional revision.  Recurring questions are the issues of reciprocity and burden- 
sharing.  United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard L. Armitage have both said publicly that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is 
an obstacle to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.41  Both of these top U.S. diplomats 
have stated that the issue of constitutional revision is a matter for the Japanese themselves 
 
38 Michael O’Hanlon, “Bold Basing Plan.” Washington Times, 4 April 2004, B3. 
39 Sankei (Tokyo), 21 April 2004. 
40 Perry and Yoshihara, 167-168. 
41 Japan Times, “Article 9 Hindering U.S. Ties, Bid for UNSC Seat: Armitage,” Japan Times Online 
[home page on-line]; available from http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/gearticle.pl5?nn20040723a1.htm; 
Internet; accessed 27 July 2004.  
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to decide.  Furthermore, both have stated that the United States supports Japan’s 
permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that there is 
no linkage between revising Article 9 and UNSC permanent membership. 
The Japanese are seriously wrestling with this issue because in many regards they 
realize there is a linkage.  All permanent Security Council members are required to use 
military force for the good of the international community, something that the Japanese 
are restricted from doing by their constitution.  A remedy to this issue being examined by 
Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is to create a special UN standby 
force.  The DPJ is in favor of constitutional revision, but its views of revision differ from 
the views of the LDP.  Essentially, the DPJ advocates a revision of the constitution in 
order to allow the JSDF to use force on overseas missions based on UNSC resolutions.  A 
special UN standby force would be the result and would remedy the issue of reciprocity 
by participating in collective security.  An analysis of this option concludes that this 
course of action is predicated on a viable U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the cornerstone 
of Japan’s defense and suggests that Japan would not want to exercise collective defense 
and make a more reciprocal alliance with the United States.   
Another remedy that may gain more attention is reinterpretation.  Osaka 
University postgraduate Professor Kazuya Sakamoto states that “Article 9 of Japan’s 
constitution only prohibits Japan from using force-or threatening to use force- as a means 
of settling international disputes.  That’s why I see no need to revise the constitution.”  
Under careful analysis, this “reinterpretation” allows Japan to use force for collective 
defense, which is recognized by international law to be Japan’s right.  This implies 
however, that the force Japan may use and under what conditions it may be deployed 
must be thoroughly articulated and possibly made into law.42  In some respects, defining 
the force and parameters for using force under the existing constitution may provide little 
change from the status quo. 
As the debates progress, it appears that many in Japan aim to internationalize the 
JSDF in proceeding toward a more reciprocal relationship with both the United States 
and with the United Nations. To do this, constitutional reinterpretation or revision is 
 
42 Sankei (Tokyo), 29 July 2004. 
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required. Japan also seeks a permanent seat on the UNSC, and to do this many believe 
they must reinterpret or revise their constitution.  Japan’s restrictive constitution 
handicaps it from projecting the diplomatic and political influence it could have, 
considering its economic power.  These were not objectives during the Cold War, as 
Japan focused on economic reconstruction under the security blanket of the U.S-Japan 
Security Alliance.  This alliance, however, put Japan in a position where its foreign 
policy was subordinated to that of another country.  Japan realizes that this is in part due 
to the security alliance not being reciprocal with the United States, as it is between the 
United States and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Considering this and the emergence of China and India as economic competitors, Japan 
wishes to be in a position to influence and participate more effectively in world affairs.  
As a result, polls indicate that most Japanese citizens and lawmakers believe that a 
change to the Japanese constitution is required.  Along these lines, former Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda connected the deployment of JSDF troops to Iraq in early 2004 
with Japan’s national interests.  Fukuda stated: 
 It’s extremely important for Japan to give lots of attention to relations 
with other countries.  Japan, a resourceless island nation, sells good 
quality products it manufactures using other countries’ resources and then 
sells to other countries.  This has been the major driving force to support 
the Japanese economy.  For this reason, the world needs to be stable and 
peaceful.  We must think hard about whether it is a good thing for Japan to 
stand on the sidelines.  Japan’s responsibility for the international 
community is being tested. 43
 A vexing situation for Japan with respect to constitutional revision is its 
relationship with the United States.  Many in Japan worry that should the constitution be 
revised  to provide for the use of collective defense, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
would evolve into a more reciprocal alliance by which Japan may be committed to 
supporting the United States in trouble spots throughout the globe.  Furthermore, many 
believe that not changing the constitution to do more, as Fukuda asserts above, may leave 




43 Sankei (Tokyo), 26 January 2004. 
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E. THE CHALLENGES OF THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY  
Based on trends and developments of the 1990’s and considering the historic 
dispatch of JSDF personnel to Iraq in 2004, this section examines some of the challenges 
of the JSDF.  The leitmotif in this section is that even with a reinterpreted or revised 
constitution permitting Japan to exercise collective defense, the JSDF is not at the level 
of readiness to replace the capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan. 
Ostensibly, besides the size of forces, the gap in technology and equipment is the 
most salient difference between the JSDF and U.S. forces.  Primarily, and as a result of 
the pacifist constitution, the JSDF does not have aircraft carriers, long range strategic 
bombers, offensive long range ballistic missiles, high altitude spy planes, or other major 
armaments associated with offensive warfare.  However, in light of the North Korea 
nuclear weapons threat (see Chapter IV) ballistic missile defense (BMD) has become a 
goal as announced by Prime Minister Koizumi at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting on May 
23, 2003,44 and as indicated in a formal decision by the Japanese Cabinet on December 
19, 2003.  The Japan Defense Agency’s Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for 
FY2001-FY2005 recognized that Japan must address the “growing proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,” but it was not until after the first 
round of the six-party talks on August 28, 2003, when North Korea suggested it had 
nuclear weapons that Tokyo became more active in BMD development.  As a result, the 
Koizumi Cabinet directed the JDA to work with the United States to develop the 
technology of building “its own [layered] BMD system through upgrading and joint 
operation of currently deployed destroyers equipped with the Aegis system45 and the 
Patriot surface-to-air missile systems.”46   
Current gaps in the BMD of Japan is that Japan cannot provide a round-the-clock 
shield against ballistic missile attack due to logistical limitations and the impossibility of 
keeping their few Aegis ships out to sea for more than a month at a time.  Along these 
 
44 Defense of Japan 2003, 383. 
45 Aegis, which means shield, is the U.S. Navy’s latest surface combat system. Aegis was designed 
and developed as a complete system, capable of engaging in simultaneous warfare on several fronts -- air, 
surface, subsurface, and strike. Anti-Air Warfare elements include the Radar System AN/SPY-1B/D, 
Command and Decision System, and Weapons Control System.  
46 “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures,” Cabinet Decision, 13 
December 2003. 
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lines, U.S. forces in Japan will begin in 2005 by assisting Japan with patrolling the Sea of 
Japan with Aegis destroyers loaded with Standard Missile III (SM-3) intercept missiles, 
until the Japanese BMD system is better developed with the introduction of the FPS-XX 
radar, which is forecasted for 2007.47  The FPS-XX is a warning and control radar system 
which uses electronic scanning to control the orientation of electromagnetic waves and 
designed to detect ballistic missiles, such as North Korea’s Nodong.48 Furthermore, 
Patriot Advanced Capability III (PAC-3) units in Japan can not cover all of Japan’s 
islands and as a consequence, they cover only certain cities and military installations. 
Hence, Japan is developing their future BMD system by up-grading their Aegis-equipped 
ships, the future FPS-XX radar, SM-3 and PAC-3 systems.  The BMD gap highlights the 
importance of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance, an alliance which is providing the 
capability to cover this gap. Even if the Japanese Constitution is reinterpreted or revised 
sooner rather than latter, this type of assistance under the security alliance will still be 
required until Japanese BMD technology and equipment is fully developed and tested.   
A Special Forces capability is an area that the Japanese began to address in 2004.  
In light of the rising threat of international terrorism the JDA announced on March 29, 
2004 the creation of a new 300-man, Special Operations Group (SOG) of the JGSDF 
based at Narashino in Chiba Prefecture, near Tokyo.  The SOG is under the direct control 
of the director-general of the JDA in dealing with terrorist and guerilla attacks.  
Additionally, the JGSDF reinforced the 1st Airborne Brigade with 400 more troops and 
modifying their mission to augment the SOG.  These are steps in a direction to give 
Japanese leaders more capabilities and options to deal with emerging threats to their 
homeland.  These units have the potential to evolve into expeditionary forces and become 
the core Japanese forces for overseas special operations missions, but they are still too 
small and too inexperienced to address the wide spectrum of potential missions and they 
lack joint training and military-to-military relationships. 
 
47 Hiroyuki Akita, “U.S. to Beef up Missile Defense Teamwork with Japan,” Nihon Keizai 
(Washington), 24 March 2004. 
48 CDI, “Japan: Recent Step-up in Missile Defense,” CDI Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1725; Internet; accessed 21 August 
2004.  
23 
                                                
  In accordance with Japan’s 1995 NDPO, the JSDF began to restructure from 
180,000 to 160,000 troops of which 145,000 are active-duty.  Furthermore, the JSDF has 
reorganized its force levels from 13 divisions and 2 combined brigades to 9 divisions and 
6 brigades, evidence of an emphasis to become lighter and more capable of addressing 
different threats.  The purpose of those reforms was to “provide high quality and [a more] 
effective” JSDF.49  With the current review of the NDPO, Koizumi is looking at 
furthering the “JSDF transformation” with downsizing heavy weapons systems and shape 
a leaner, more technologically savvy fighting force.  With a reinterpreted or revised 
constitution, an adjustment in the U.S-Japan Security Alliance where Japan will assume a 
larger role in burden-sharing should be anticipated.  As a result, Japan will have to review 
its force levels in order to meet the challenges of an expanding role of participating in its 
own defense.   
Closely linked to personnel strength is the requirement for advanced equipment 
and technology for precise and efficient use of a leaner force.  Apart from the nuclear 
umbrella, Japan lacks large budget items found in the American inventory and currently 
available to Japan’s defense.  This effectively handicaps Japan from dropping the U.S.-
Japan Security Alliance, even with a reinterpreted or revised Japanese Constitution.  
Although there is little doubt that Japan could acquire items such as amphibious shipping 
and vehicles, maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) and other types of combat 
shipping, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and stealth aircraft, including space-based 
reconnaissance systems, it would take years to obtain and competently employ them.  
Additionally, besides the many items currently being developed by the United States as 
part of its military transformation, such as tilt-rotor aircraft, Japan lacks a self-contained 
expeditionary force with the logistics to conduct up to 60 days of continuous combat 
operations without re-supply, a capability offered only through the U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance.  Even though Japan actually has a technologically advanced military, the United 
States is still way ahead in terms of command, control communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and many research and 
development (R&D) efforts focusing on network-centric warfare, which is causing a 
 
49 JDA, JDA Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.jda.co.jp; Internet; accessed 6 
April 2004. 
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“digital divide” between the United States and Japan, including other allies.50  The 
Pentagon’s accelerated transformation of U.S. forces after 9/11 may outpace Japan’s 
defense evolution, possibility validating a greater need for the alliance which contains 
many capabilities and advantages for both nations, even with a reinterpreted or revised 
Japanese Constitution.        
It is conventional wisdom that Japan could launch a massive recruitment drive in 
a sluggish economy and purchase or manufacture many of the items listed above, 
including nuclear weapons.51  However, the intervening variable is in joint training and 
the competence required for interoperability in expeditionary and low-intensity to mid-
intensity conflicts intrinsic to post-Cold War threats.  The JDA has already identified the 
deficiency of “jointness” and announced in the Defense Program for FY2003: An 
Overview, that the JDA will enhance joint operational capabilities.  Japan’s SDF 
conducted joint training in early 2004, the first joint exercise since 1998, which exposed 
the lack of experience and interoperability of the three services of the SDF.  Fundamental 
differences must be worked out, such as map reading, communications and computer 
systems, practicing takeoff and landing of JGSDF aircraft on Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force (JMSDF) shipping, and military terminology indicative of a required 
crawl, walk, run approach, to become a streamlined joint force as Koizumi envisions.  
Consequently, the development of BMD will compel the JSDF to modernize and 
integrate their roles in critical areas.52  Japan has taken a monumental first step in 
addressing this deficiency by creating the post of Joint Staff Chief (JSC) in Japanese 
fiscal year (JFY) 2005, which is different from the current JSC chairman, who acts only 
 
50 Defense of Japan 2003, 41. 
51 Serving in the JSDF is not very popular in Japan.  An example is when 82 JGSDF members were asked not to 
wear their uniforms and change into civilian attire upon their return to Japan via Narita International Airport in Tokyo 
from ODA missions in Iraq on 7 August 2004.  In a 12 June 2004 Asahi Shimbun poll, 48% of the Japanese public 
answered that the SDF is close to the public with 50% giving negative answers.  Additionally, 11% of the Japanese 
public believes that the SDF is currently unconstitutional, while another 49% say the constitution should be amended to 
allow for the SDF’s existence.  The U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, Opinion Analysis, “An End to 
Japanese Pacifism?” by James S. Marshall, reported on 20 August 2003 that seven-in-ten (68%) thought that the SDF 
should continue to emphasis disaster relief as their primary mission.  Interestingly, more Japanese (58%) believe that 
the SDF should protect the nation from attack, up from 45% in 2000, prior to 9/11.   
52 Michael Swaine and others, “Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense” Rand Online [home page on-
line]; available from  http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1374/MR1374.ch1.pdf; Internet; accessed 
21 August 2004, 5. 
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as a liaison.  The incumbent of the new post will actually be in command of the three 
SDF services and will also control personnel management and the budget.53
This section underscores the importance of maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan 
Security Alliance, even with a reinterpreted or revised Japanese Constitution allowing for 
Japan to exercise collective defense and accepting a wider burden-sharing role.  
Furthermore, in addition to exercising collective defense and providing for its homeland 
security, other activities such as participation in collective security operations and PKO 
missions with the United Nations will test Japan’s resolve to participate more in global 
affairs.  Should the Japanese reject this role in the future, the U.S-Japan Security Alliance 
remains as their insurance policy to fall back on.  This option will be kept open by Tokyo 
because, as outlined in previous sections, the Japanese public may not be ready to follow 
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III. OKINAWA’S BURDEN 
A. BACKGROUND 
Okinawa’s rich and exotic history spans centuries of documented trade and strife 
and is replete with tales of farmers repulsing invaders, engendering the art of karate.  
Okinawa, the main island of the Ryukyu (Liu-ch’iu in Chinese) island chain, south of 
Kyushu, Japan was the center of the former Ryukyu Kingdom, and the town of Shuri was 
its capital.  Okinawa is “inhabited by a people who in language and culture are a variant 
of the Japanese people,”54 and are identified today as the largest minority in Japan.  The 
former Ryukyu Kingdom, with its own distinct line of kings, had tributary relations with 
China for centuries.  It continued under tight control after it was subjugated by the 
Shimazu daimyo of Satsuma, Kyushu, Japan and ruled as a vassal domain since 1609.55   
In 1879, shortly after the onset of the Meiji Restoration, Japan claimed the 160 islands 
which make-up the Ryukyu island chain as Okinawa Prefecture, the 47th prefecture of 
Japan, and eventually made Naha City on the main island of Okinawa the prefecture’s 
capital.   
From April to June 1945, Okinawa was the site of the last battle of World War II, 
with mop-up operations continuing into August that year.  In 1940, the population on the 
island of Okinawa was 435,000,56 and in the Battle of Okinawa, a tragic 130,000 
Okinawan civilians were killed in the crossfire.  In 2004, the population of Okinawa 
prefecture is estimated at 1.3 million people living on fifty islands with the majority on 
the main island of Okinawa.57   
There are countless memorials, scarred landscape, and stories recalled by aging 
war survivors who are constantly reminded of war by the incessant sight of American and 
Japanese military bases on Okinawa.  The American bases have remained in one form or 
 
54 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 511.   
55 Ibid., 409. 
56 Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, The War in the Pacific, 
Okinawa: The Last Battle, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 9. 
57 OPG, OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=585&page=1; Internet; accessed 16 
August 2004. 
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another since 1945.  To the surprise of the Okinawans, bases remained even after 
reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 following the 1969 Nixon-Sato Summit.    
Among the U.S. military forces stationed on the 66 mile long island are all four 
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The majority of the forces are Marines, followed by 
the Air Force, and small numbers of Army and Navy personnel.  The major units are the 
III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) of roughly 18,000 Marines on Okinawa with 
additional subordinate units in mainland Japan, and the Air Force’s 18th Wing of about 
7,000 airmen.58   The Army’s 10th Area Support Group has over 1,000 personnel and the 
Navy’s Fleet Activities, coupled with naval personnel assigned to the U.S. Naval 
Hospital and administered under a separate chain-of-command on Okinawa, total several 
thousand naval personnel.  The total number of U.S. military personnel on Okinawa 
fluctuates slightly, but tends to be under 30,000 active-duty members with about 24,000 
family members and civilian personnel.59      
This history and these facts trigger Okinawans to see themselves as a Japanese 
colony leased to the United States.  Okinawans host over 60 percent of U.S. forces in 
Japan and provide 75 percent of the land required for bases in Japan, but Okinawa itself 
only accounts for 0.6 percent of the total land mass of Japan.60  However, when 
considering all the bases and facilities required for U.S. forces in Japan, joint use 
facilities in mainland Japan is the intervening variable, and as a result, the statistics 
change to only 23.5 percent of the total land required for U.S. bases in Japan is actually in 
Okinawa.  Nevertheless, this actual or perceived unequal distribution of forces between 
mainland Japan and Okinawa has resulted in Okinawans accusing Tokyo of selling them 
out.   While the rest of Japan expresses sympathy for Okinawa, it espouses a not-in-my-
backyard attitude towards relieving Okinawa of some of the U.S. military bases.  Over 
the years, Okinawans have called this unequal distribution of forces, consumption of 
 
58 Kadena Air Base, Kadena Air Base Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www-
02.kadena.af.mil/18wg/staff/18wgpa/PAWeb/facts.htm ; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004. 
59 USFJ, USFJ Online [home page on-line]; available from http://usfj.mil; Internet; accessed 12 
August 2004. 
60 OPG, “Basic Thoughts on Military Base Reduction and Realignment,” OPG Online [home page on-
line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=592&page=1; 
Internet; accessed 16 August 2004. 
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scarce land, 61 incidents and accidents involving U.S. military personnel and other 
problems, real or invented, a “burden.”  Okinawans assert that they have shouldered an 
unequal share of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which provides a security blanket for 
all of Japan, for too many years and that this burden must be lessened if not equally 
shared by mainland Japan.   
B. UNCOVERING PERCEPTIONS 
1. The “Connect-the-Dots” Experience 
Okinawans have articulated the burden well over the years by enlightening 
visitors of their “connect-the-dots” experience.  The incumbent governor, Keiichi 
Inamine, explains the experience as a series of incidents and accidents caused by or 
involving U.S. military personnel dating back to 1945.  A visitor may perceive local 
attitudes towards an incident or accident as disproportionate to the case, too emotional, 
and simply an over-reaction.  However, Okinawans will see the case as the latest in a 
long string of similar incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan 
perspective, had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in 
accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).62   
An example of the “connect-the-dots” experience is the crash of a U.S. Marine 
Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter into Okinawa International University on August 
13, 2004. Okinawans connect this crash with a U.S. Marine Corps UH-1N helicopter 
crash on Camp Hansen in July 1998; a U.S. Air Force F-15 jet crashing after take-off on 
Kadena Air Base in April 1994; a U.S. jet crash into an Okinawan’s house in December 
1961 resulting in deaths and injuries; and finally a U.S. military airplane’s crash into an 
 
61 Eleven percent of all the islands which comprise the Prefecture of Okinawa are used for U.S. 
military bases and facilities.  On the actual main island of Okinawa Prefecture, which is the island of 
Okinawa, 19 percent of the land is used for U.S. military bases and facilities. 
62 Along with the “connect-the-dots” experience, the SOFA is just another irritable issue which 
Okinawans believe they receive the “short-end of the stick” because they have a larger and more 
concentrated military presence than other prefectures in Japan. Many Okinawan and mainland Japanese 
officials have joined and called for the revision of SOFA because they see it as allowing extraterritorial 
privileges and for it being forced upon Japan at a disadvantageous time.  The current SOFA is a result of 
Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of 
America signed on 19 January 1960 in Washington, DC. 
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elementary school in June 1959, resulting in the deaths and injuries of many Okinawan 
children.63   
The “connect-the-dots” experience fuels a victimization sentiment that blinds 
Okinawans to any other perspective.  This is evident when Americans who are killed or 
injured in accidents while in service of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance receive little to 
no public concern from Okinawans.64  Instead, Okinawans focus their efforts on drawing 
attention to the “constant” danger Okinawans are subject to, seeming to completely 
disregard the Americans lives that were at risk.  Their diverted attention is the alibi they 
use for their indifference towards American lives, but the irony is that these actions are 
actually contrary to the commonly recognized benevolent character of individual 
Okinawans.  
2.  The Lack of Continuity 
On the U.S. side, there is a lack of continuity on the issues that make-up the 
burden of Okinawa.  A cause for this appears to be the short amount of time many U.S. 
service members serve on Okinawa and in mainland Japan.  This is particularly true for 
the Marine Corps, which deploys units from the United States to Okinawa on six-month 
cycles under the unit deployment program (UDP).  Additionally, most other Marines who 
serve on Okinawa report there with individual orders for a one-year tour of duty in which 
they join their unit on Okinawa.  These lengths of service on Okinawa serve operational 
and administrative purposes; however, they fail to create the buy-in needed to become a 
part of the local community and thus, good neighbors.  Chapter V examines the need and 
efforts of the Marine Corps to create more community buy-in from its Marines, especially 
the younger Marines who spent shorter amounts of time on Okinawa.  Nearly half of the 
 
63 The Okinawa Prefectural Government reports in “Promoting Resolution of Issues Concerning U.S. 
Military Bases on Okinawa,” that there have been 217 aircraft-related incidents on Okinawa between 1972 
and December 2002. The vast majority of these incidents were not crashes but rather, precautionary 
emergency landings.  See, OPG, “Promoting Resolution of Issues Concerning U.S. Military Bases on 
Okinawa,” OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/4587/Petition20031116.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 August 
2004.  Also see, OPG, “Impact on the Lives of the Okinawan People (Incidents, Accidents and 
Environmental Issues),” OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=586&page=1; Internet; accessed 16 
August 2004. 
64 The safety and well-being of the pilots and crew of the 13 August 2004 CH-53D helicopter crash 
and, past similar events, on Okinawa received token public concern from Okinawans.   
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entire U.S. military population in Japan is 25 years old or younger65 and many are 
concentrated on Okinawa with short tours of duty. 
The lack of continuity is also prevalent among senior military personnel.  Due to 
the very nature of high operational tempo and needs of the individual services, personnel 
frequently rotate billets and are unable to foster mature, professional relationships with 
local officials.  Furthermore, constant rotation of billets effectively handicaps the ability 
to create the in-depth knowledge and expertise required to handle delicate issues rooted 
in deep historical context and perpetuates the perception that the U.S. military lacks 
consideration for the interests of the local populace.  This perception undermines gestures 
of good will and attempts to be a good neighbor by the U.S. military.  
3. No Direct Benefits Realized 
Through in-depth dialogue with Okinawans, it becomes apparent that an 
overwhelming majority of Okinawans do not realize the direct, tangible benefits of 
having U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa.  Over 12,000 Japanese nationals on Okinawa 
are employed on U.S. military bases, either funded by the Government of Japan or the 
United States government, or through non-appropriated funded (NAF) activities, such as 
Morale, Welfare, Recreation (MWR) and other similar organizations.  For the most part, 
these are well-paying jobs with handsome benefits and are fiercely competed for by the 
local populace.  Okinawa prefecture suffers from high unemployment—7 percent, while 
the rest of Japan is at 4.6 percent.66   There are many other tangible economic benefits 
that Okinawans do appreciate and enjoy which is a direct result of U.S. forces being 
stationed on Okinawa.  It is estimated that U.S. military presence injects about $1.4 
billion into the Okinawan economy or at least 5 percent and as much as 10 percent of 
Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural Product (GPP).67    
 
65 USFJ, “USFJ Fact Sheet,” USFJ Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://usfj.mil/fact_sheet/brochure.html; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004. 
66 Ryukyu Shimpo (Naha), “Unemployment in 7% Range for Four Years,” Ryukyu Shimpo Online 
[home page on-line]; available from http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp/english/enews/ 
e040408.html#enews_08 ; Internet; accessed 9 April 2004. 
67 The Okinawa Prefectural Government’s most up-to-date and available public report on the impact 
of the U.S. military presence on the prefectural economy is six years-old (1998), which reports that the U.S. 
military presence accounts for 5 percent of the gross prefectural product. See, OPG, OPG Online [home 
page on-line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp? 
cateid=14$id=658&page=1; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.  A 1999 study by the Nansei Shoto 
Industrial Advancement Center indicates that U.S. presence could account for 10 percent of the GPP. 
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Regardless of the lucrative financial and other appealing opportunities U.S. forces 
bring to Okinawa, the situation is absorbed as a matter of routine and is played down by 
the inability for the local populace to compare and contrast their economic situation 
without U.S. forces there.  Current generations of working-age Okinawans possess no 
experience of life without U.S. forces on Okinawa, over 59 years.  Therefore, it is quite 
simple for the idea to germinate that Okinawans do not benefit in proportion to having 60 
percent of Japan-based U.S. forces stationed on the small tropical island.  There is a 
declining number of Okinawans and mainland Japanese who remember the days of war 
and subsequent threats from the former Soviet Union which were deflected by the 
security umbrella cast by the United States.  Furthermore, younger generations of 
Okinawans have little comprehension of the costs of freedom, which is in stark contrast 
to the older generation who were caught in the crossfire of the last battle of World War II.  
This is partly due to the lack of formal education on this subject throughout Japan and 
also due to very low levels of Okinawans serving in Japan’s Self-Defense Force and 
therefore most Okinawans possess no direct knowledge or experience of the challenges to 
preserving their freedoms from external threats.   
Present-day Japanese opponents of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance recognize 
these cultural subtleties and have cleverly retarded progressive drives for better 
understanding of the direct contribution to Okinawans by U.S. forces by exploiting 
accidents and minor incidents and using them to invalidate all positive community 
contribution, participation, and interaction.  These often minor events are seized upon and 
gradually mutate into invented problems which eventually overshadow the benefits of 
having U.S. forces on Okinawa.  The maxim “all good deeds are undone by one bad 
deed” fits perfectly here, except the presumed bad deed is often distorted.  
An example of an invented incident was the case of an alleged .50-caliber 
machine-gun round fired from a U.S. Marine Corps range (range 10, in the Central 
Training Area) and landing in a farmer’s pineapple field in northern Okinawa in June  
2002.68  The incident caused a storm of complaints by Okinawan community leaders of 
the hazards of Marine Corps training on Okinawa.  This prompted Marine Corps officials 
to host a briefing and demonstration of the safety measures taken by the Marine Corps for 
 
68 Japan Update, “Marine Stray Bullet Lands on Pineapple Field,” Japan Update Online [home page 
on-line]; available from   http://www.japanupdate.com/en/?id=745; Internet; accessed 17 September 2004. 
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Okinawan community leaders and investigators in order to ease their safety concerns 
posed by conducting live-fire on the training ranges.  The investigation concluded that 
there were “no witnesses nor scientific evidence to prove that it was a stray round from 
[Marine Corps]  ranges,”69 and leaving many officials, both American and Japanese, to 
believe that the .50-caliber machine-gun round was very old and perhaps a war remnant. 
The actions taken by U.S. Marine Corps officials in response to the stray round 
incident of 2002 may have been seen as unnecessary, frivolous and inconvenient.  
However, they demonstrate a growing trend among U.S. officials in Okinawa to make the 
extra effort in order to alleviate concerns expressed by the local populace and community 
leaders.  These extra efforts taken by U.S. officials to alleviate concerns raised from 
probable invented incidents indicate an overall reversal of how the complaints of 
Okinawans are handled.  In the past, Okinawans’ calls for explanations and changes were 
greeted by U.S. forces and Government of Japan officials with references made to the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement.  These bureaucratic 
responses were perceived as the standard and stagnant party line attached to lofty ideas 
that hold no significant meaning to the common Okinawan.  As a result, some Okinawans 
felt that their complaints were not taken seriously.  Today, many Okinawans still feel that 
their complaints are not taken seriously, which may contribute to consternation among a 
larger segment of the Okinawan community when another incident or accident occurs, no 
matter how significant or whether real or invented.   
4. The Economic Contribution of U.S. Forces 
Closely related to the above section and one that aggravates the situation on 
Okinawa and the Okinawans’ relationship with Tokyo is the economy.  Okinawa’s main 
industry is tourism, which prior to 9-11 was only susceptible to inclement weather, but 
now vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military bases.  
Furthermore, Okinawa has the lowest per capita income in Japan.70  As of 2001, 
Okinawans average nearly half the income of those who live in Tokyo.71  This is 
 
69 Kaori Martinez, GS-11, Community Relations Specialist, AC/S G-5, Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Smedley D. Butler, during an e-mail interview on 20 September 2004. 
70 Okinawa Development Agency (ODA), Okinawa Economic Survey, December 1999, 14. 
71 CAO, “Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2004 –No Gains Without 
Reforms IV- Summary,” CAO Online [home page on-line]; Available from  http://www.cao.go.jp; Internet; 
accessed 23 July 2004, 39. 
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compounded by the highest unemployment rate in Japan, as previously reported. The lack 
of well-paying full time employment is a problem for Okinawa.  This is indicated by the 
fact that Okinawa has the highest ratio (6.2 percent) in Japan for those who have changed 
a job and is in the top five prefectures in Japan for those who have quit a job due to low 
wages and benefits.72  The Okinawa prefectural government and the U.S. military are the 
top two full-time employers on Okinawa.  Okinawans acknowledge that the bases 
provide jobs, contracts and construction, land rental, and spending by U.S. military 
personnel totaling a contribution of 5 to 10 percent of Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural 
Product (GPP).  These data actually demonstrate that U.S. military bases are not the 
“burden” they are made out to be, but actually contribute something practical to the local 
community.  However, those who are more vocal in opposing the bases focus on the 
disparity between Okinawa, the poorest prefecture, and the rest of mainland Japan by 
using figures such as the above employment and per capita income numbers.  Politicians 
highlight them also and use them as bargaining chips in order to gain concessions from 
Tokyo.  The politicians and others who are more vocal in opposing U.S. military 
presence are the minority in Okinawa and find that being vocal in opposing U.S. military 
presence has its benefits.  A farmer whose land was used to build Kadena Air Base 
protests annually to Tokyo, “not that he really wants his land back…but to pressure the 
[central] government to increase his compensation check.”73  
5. Inter-Service Discord and its Influence on Public Opinion 
There is yet another factor which is rarely discussed but shapes the perception on 
who is the irritant in the security alliance--American inter-service discord.  Although 
discord is mild, it is embarrassingly noticed by Japanese and Okinawan officials.74  In an 
interview conducted by the Japanese newspaper Mainichi with the former director-
general of the Japan Defense Agency, Mr. Shigeru Ishiba had this to say about Secretary 
Rumsfield’s push to do something about Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, “…I believe 
in the Defense Department, there are forces opposing reform.”75  This section aims to 
 
72 Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, The 2002 
Employment Status Survey: Summary of Results,” Available from http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/ 
shugyou/2002/kakuhou/youyaku.htm#11; Internet; accessed 23 July 2004. 
73 John Sylvester, “Okinawa Forever?” Raleigh News and Observer, 12 July 2001, 19. 
74 Asahi (Tokyo), 25 March 2004. 
75 Mainichi (Tokyo), 08 April 2004. 
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shed light on an issue which may be becoming more obvious.  As the Marine Corps 
searches for ways to “lessen the burden” on Okinawa and transform with the rest of DoD, 
the Air Force on Okinawa may not be embracing change and may be clinging to 
antiquated basing models.   
Through in-depth observation and conversations with many Japanese, and 
Okinawans alike, I detected an attitude which ranked the U.S. Armed Forces in a 
hierarchy, in traditional Confucian76 manner.  Hiroshi Kitamura wrote about this sense of 
hierarchy and its psychological derivatives in his 1971 publication, Psychological 
Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations.  Kitamura stated, “the first element is the 
Japanese tendency to view their foreign relations hierarchically, in terms of “high” and 
“low” (jo ge kankei), just as Japanese usually view their personal relations.”77  Polls 
between December 1992 and November 2000 clearly demonstrate that Okinawans desire 
the return of the U.S. Air Force’s Kadena Air Base above all others.78   However, the 
results of these polls do not manifest in official demands to remove the Air Force from 
Okinawa, why?  It may be due to the U.S. Marine Corps’ larger footprint with many 
smaller bases, called camps, spread throughout the island.  With bases and camps spread 
throughout the island of Okinawa (see Figure 1), the Marine Corps is the largest target 
upon which to anchor anti-base movements.  There is yet another dimension to this-- it is 










76 Confucianism concerns itself with humanistic ethics and virtues.  A touchstone of Confucianism is 
the promotion of organizing society into an order of  hierarchical authority with an emphasis on status.  
77 Hiroshi Kitamura, Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1971), 11. 
78 Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, Department 






























Figure 1.   U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa 
 (From: Facilities Engineer’s, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler) 
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Hideomi Kinoshita of Kyodo’s, Washington, DC Bureau stated that the Japanese, 
including Okinawans, see the U.S. military services through a Japanese cultural filter that 
ranks them in a hierarchical ladder, validating Kitamura’s assertions.  Kinoshita stated 
that the Japanese rank the Navy on top, followed closely by the Air Force and then by the 
Army.  According to Kinoshita, the Marine Corps holds a distant last place, as it is seen 
as the paradigm of militarism and brings back bitter memories of Imperial Japan which 
pitted Okinawans in the middle of the fiercest battle of the Pacific Campaign in World 
War II.79  Okinawans are not anti-American but they are anti-military and still live with 
the harsh memories of World War II.  The U.S. Marine Corps’ intense warrior-like 
subculture is an affront to Okinawans and as a result the Marines are relegated to an 
inferior status.  Reinforcing Japanese views of higher status is the ability for the Japanese 
to point to the seat of authority for USFJ on Yokota Air Base and take note of the top 
U.S. military leader in Japan, commander of U.S. Forces Japan, as always being an Air 
Force general, who is also the commander of 5th Air Force.   
Kinoshita stated that these views are not openly discussed because many Japanese 
find it difficult to excuse this type of discrimination.  I also found that there are mixed 
feelings among Japanese towards the Marines in Japan, where there is an overwhelming 
sense of admiration for the Marines Corps as an institution.  Many nationalist-minded 
Japanese who espouse the culturalist perspective towards national structures recognize 
that the U.S. Marine Corps possesses a proud fighting legacy and upholds a code of core 
values reminiscent of the revered samurai code; however, this is not the fashionable 
position to take openly in pacifist Japan. 
Okinawans also put a lot of meaning into localized actions, such as how Kadena 
Air Base officials forbid Marines to patronize Air Force enlisted clubs, fearing outbreaks 
of fights amidst bravado talk mixed with intoxication, but the same restriction is not 
imposed on airmen at Marine enlisted clubs.  Okinawans are also amused by Air Force 
and Marine officials being split regarding the enforcement of liberty control measures for 
U.S. service members on Okinawa.  For example, the common denominator in crime and 
incidents involving U.S. service members on Okinawa is intoxication and underage 
consumption of alcohol.  One example is the Air Force’s imposition of the alcohol  
79 Hideomi Kinoshita, Staff Correspondent, Kyodo News, Washington Bureau, during an interview by 
author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004. 
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consumption age of 20, consistent with Japanese law, but the Marine Corps enforces U.S. 
alcohol consumption age standards on its members-- 21.   
The absence of a Marine attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo until the 
establishment of the position in January 2002 may have also marginalized the advocacy 
of Marine issues in Japan in the past.  The Marine Corps had no official liaison with the 
Political Affairs branch of the Japanese Defense Agency and was essentially hedging for 
proper representation from the naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo and through 
Headquarters USFJ.  A Marine Corps press release said, “the Marine Corps decided [in 
1998] that it would be best for the Marine Corps to have a Marine representative in the 
U.S. embassy to present [the Marine Corps] point of view... [such as its] large presence 
and SACO..."  Dissension came in the form of voices within DoD reasoning that Japan 
did not have a Marine Corps and therefore there was no reason to have a Marine 
liaison.80   
During a command brief at Headquarters USFJ in the summer of 2001, there was 
an inaccurate portrayal of the political and social situation facing U.S. forces on Okinawa 
that included a negative emphasis on the Marines, similar to what is heard in biased 
portions of the Japanese media.  This USFJ command brief was the same brief given to 
key U. S. government leaders who had little exposure and no continuity regarding U. S. 
forces in Japan and travel there for fact-finding and familiarization.  Upon hearing the 
brief, Marine Brigadier General, Timothy R. Larsen81 requested a review of the brief to 
reflect the true and accurate situation on Okinawa and invited the key staff of USFJ to go 
to Okinawa for familiarization tours and briefs on a regular basis. 
Over the years, Okinawans have framed their opinion on which service offers the 
path of least resistance by finding “ammunition” to protest against.  The U.S. Marine 
Corps has been singled out and “ammunition” derives from its larger footprint, higher 
number of troops, and other military subcultural issues.  The point here is that these 
perceptions among voting Okinawans have shaped their view on which is the dominant 
military service and therefore harder to protest against, and which is the weaker.   
 
80 Press release abstract provided by Colonel David P. Rann, Marine Attaché, American Embassy 
Tokyo during an e-mail interview on 18 April 2004. 
81 At that time, Brigadier General T. R. Larsen was the Commanding General of Marine Corps Base, 
Camp Smedley D. Butler and Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Bases Japan which consists of all the 
Marine installations in Okinawa and mainland Japan. 
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Okinawans’ attitudes towards the different branches of the U. S. Armed Forces shape 
their overall opinion, and this public opinion is reflected in polls and votes.  Politicians 
study polls and those who appeal to the individual voter’s perceptions and beliefs will 
most likely win their vote.   Many local politicians in Okinawa campaign on base issues.  
Although it has been found that extremely negative campaigning against U.S. military 
forces has not won many votes, more moderate campaigning has. One-issue candidates 
campaigning on an anti-base theme are not winning elections for mayor, nor for 
governor.  Conversely, the “moderates” who do win elections find no adverse public 
relations fallout to viscerally criticize U.S. forces and make consistent calls for SOFA 
reform among other demands.82  In June 2003, Mayor Iha won his office as mayor of 
Ginowan City in Okinawa on the pledge of a total reversion of the Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Futenma83 within five years.84   
In sum, this type of discord is not alien within DoD and has existed on Okinawa 
since the last battle of World War II took place there in 1945.85  It is noted here for the 
sole purpose of acknowledging that it influences a Confucian-based society and shapes its 
demands at the expense of the Marines.  Discord within DoD, no matter how subtle, adds 
to psychological distortion and the understanding of this dynamic will enable us to 
“appreciate the differences in their [Okinawan] ways of thinking and patterns of 
behavior, but also to understand the motives and decisions behind them.86  This is 
important to keep in mind when the option for integrating Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma, which is encroached by the congested city of Ginowan, into Kadena Air Base is 
 
82 Marine Corps Bases Japan Issues Brief,  Slide 46 of the G-5 (Community Relations Office) given 
to the Commanding General of Marine Corps Base , Camp Smedley D. Butler, Brigadier General T. R. 
Larsen, June 2002. 
83 The 1996 SACO Final Report already provides for MCAS Futenma to be returned to the 
Government of Japan; however, the Governor of Okinawa insists on a 15-year use limit which has stalled 
the process.  
84 Mainichi (Tokyo), 13 April 2004. 
85 American Inter-service rivalries were strong during World War II in the Pacific “Island-hopping” 
Campaign.  The commander of the U.S. landing force (U.S. Tenth Army comprised of Army and Marine 
units) on Okinawa in 1945 was U.S. Army Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner.  Buckner represented the 
inability among some commanders to appreciate the different strengths and capabilities each service 
possessed.  As a result, at times the different services were not properly synergized and employed.  For 
details of inter-service discord in the Battle of Okinawa, see Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone, (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 3-23. 
86 Kitamura, 36. 
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examined in Chapter V.  Underscoring this issue is an article which quoted Masahide 
Ota, House of Councilors member and former Governor of Okinawa, in a Japanese 
newspaper that he recalled discord between the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps when 
listening to U.S. Forces Japan Commander, Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas C. 
Waskow, during a speech regarding MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base consolidation 
at the Japan Press Club in August 2004.87
C. TILLING THE FIELDS OF ANIMOSITY AND DISCONTENT 
1. The Japanese Media, Incidents and SOFA 
The Japanese media, particularly on Okinawa, warrant attention as they are likely 
to degrade the views towards U.S. forces.  “The influence of the press on Japanese public 
opinion and also on political circles is substantial…”88  Professor Robert D. Eldridge of 
Osaka University recognized the tendency of the local media in Okinawa to report 
effectively from the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions,” 
but added that constant reporting of only negative issues and no coverage of issues that 
would place U.S. forces “in a favorable light” open the Okinawan media to claims of 
being biased.89
An example of how the media unfairly and prematurely cast a negative light on 
U.S. forces is when a U.S. service member is suspected of committing a crime and is in 
U.S. custody.   It begins with Okinawa Prefectural Government officials undermining the 
orderly disposition of suspected or actual criminal offenders as outlined in the SOFA, in 
accordance with Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States of America and Japan, by demanding the transfer of custody of a 
suspected individual before indictment by the Japanese courts as required by the SOFA.  
Okinawa Prefectural Government officials make this demand anticipating the U.S. 
response to be unfavorable and citing proper and agreed upon procedures as stipulated by 
the SOFA.  The local press actually exploits this opportunity to aggravate Okinawan 
opinion by playing on their emotions and reporting incomplete information.  Many 
 
87 Nihon Keizai (Tokyo), 5 September 2004, 2. 
88 Robert Scalapino, The Washington Papers: American-Japanese Relations In a Changing Era  (New 
York: The Library Press, 1972), 78.  
89 Robert D. Eldridge, Okinawa and U.S-Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Bilateral and Trilateral 
Approaches to a Sounder Okinawa Policy (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 2002), 29. 
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Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike are not familiar with the details of the SOFA and 
are thereby prejudiced against U.S. military presence when they hear or read pejorative 
details such as the “refusal” of U.S. military authorities to transfer custody of a suspect 
without reporting the context of the refusal or the procedure agreed to in the SOFA.   
The transfer of suspects and the handling of incidents and crimes, among other 
issues are the sources for calls to revise the SOFA.  Actually, both the U.S. and Japanese 
governments agree that the SOFA should be revised with respect to how it is 
implemented, but both sides have such different perspectives and views on the contents 
and scope of the revisions that very little is done to satisfy both sides.90   As a result of 
the 1995 abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen, U.S. 
authorities agreed to transfer the custody of individuals suspected of having committed 
heinous crimes, such as murder and rape,  prior to indictment by Japanese courts, called 
“sympathetic consideration.”  Following the 1995 rape incident, the U.S. and Japanese 
governments agreed to the formation of the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa, 
which addressed eight other SOFA related issues.   
Today, calls for SOFA reform are as loud as ever, citing the crash of a Marine 
Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter on August 13, 2004 and the subsequent handling 
of the crash scene.  Again, OPG officials and the media criticized the U.S. military for its 
handling of the incident and accused the U.S. side of infringing on the sovereignty of 
Japan by not allowing Japanese authorities to examine the wreckage, which was on 
Japanese territory.  Just as in the custody-related issue as described above, OPG officials 
and the media failed to explain and report the agreed upon procedures requiring the U.S. 
side to take control of the incident scene and the wreckage. 91  The “connect-the dots” 
syndrome that Okinawans experience when they hear of another aircraft crash and how it 
 
90 Giuseppe Stavale, “Kaiheitai no Soshiki ni Rikai Fukamete” (A Disconnect in the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance: Understanding Marine Corps Organization and Capabilities). Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 September 
2004, 9. 
91 In accordance with the Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, signed at 
Tokyo on 28 February 1952, under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, 
agreed view number 20 was approved and effective on 22 October 1953.  Agreed View No. 20 states, “In 
those instances where United States military aircraft crash or are forced to land on public or private 
property outside facilities and areas in use by the United States Armed Forces, appropriate representatives 
of the United States Armed Forces shall be permitted to enter private or public property without prior 
authority, provided that every effort shall be made to avoid unnecessary damage to such private and public 
property…”  
42 
                                                
was handled in the media encourages local officials to press for more compensation in 
order to “lessen the burden.”92   
2. In Search of Okinawa’s Goal 
Chapter II charts the basic intent of how DoD wants to transform; however, the 
United States does not know how Japan’s Self-Defense Force will evolve until the 
constitutional debate stabilizes into a more certain path.  As the United States transforms 
along the policies described in Chapter II and as Japan seeks to clarify its future direction, 
Okinawa must define how to remedy the “burden” caused by the large number of U.S. 
forces on Okinawa.   
Proposing a viable solution to the burden has not been adequately addressed by 
Okinawan government officials.93  The OPG should adopt a policy which communicates 
a viable solution to addressing the “burden” caused by the stationing of U.S. forces in 
Okinawa for over a half century.94  This is not likely to happen because the issue of U.S. 
forces on Okinawa is a political tool which Okinawan office seekers use to gain attention, 
and it will continue to be portrayed as a touchstone issue in order to ensure Okinawa 
remains politically relevant in Japan.  Supporting this assertion are the actions of the 
OPG after it had agreed on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, in northern 
Okinawa, in 1999.95  After many of the key issues regarding the relocation of MCAS 
Futenma appeared to embark on a positive path based on agreement, Governor Inamine 
stalled the whole process by insisting on adding a 15-year use limit to the new facility, 
 
92 Other contemporary issues which Okinawans cite as a reason to revise SOFA are issues regarding 
noise pollution, violations of the Parking Space Law, soil contamination, and payment of claims among 
other “illegal” privileges cited by Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike drawing reference to  
imperialist-imposed extraterritorial privileges.   
93 Takehiro Funakoshi, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Japan Washington, 
DC stated during an interview by author, Washington, DC, on 12 May 2004 that the official Government of 
Japan position is that “lessening the burden” equates to no one specific remedy and should be considered 
on the individual issue on a case-by-case matter.  Essentially, in some cases “lessening the burden” may 
equate to land return while in other cases it may equate to troop reduction or other remedies. 
94 On 16 November 2003 OPG submitted a petition to visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfield, on only generalized measures for the U.S. military to take to “lessen the burden.”  OPG is yet to 
adopt an official resolution and communicate it to GOJ or USG on how to systematically “lessen the 
burden.” See, OPG, “Promoting Resolution of Issues Concerning U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, “ OPG 
Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/4587/Petition  
20031116.pdf ; Internet; accessed 17 August 2004.  
95 DFAA, “Realignment, Consolidation and Reduction of U.S. Forces Facilities and Areas in Okinawa 
Prefecture (Progress of SACO Final Report),” DFAA Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http:///www.dfaa.go.jp/enlibrary/index.html; Internet; accessed 12 August 2004. 
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thereby creating more political mileage.  After the 1996 SACO Final Report96 appeared 
to adequately address the concerns and demands of Okinawans, eight years later it 
appears from the voices of the political elite in Okinawa that efforts of the 1996 SACO 
did virtually nothing.   
In addition to gaining economic and other concessions from Tokyo and 
Washington, Okinawan officials have been encouraged to maintain their focus on base 
issues as they have received more attention from national leaders from both Japan and the 
United States in the past ten years than ever before.  Washington may have galvanized 
Naha’s rhetoric by sending national leaders to pay visits or office calls to the governor of 
Okinawa instead of keeping them oriented towards Tokyo.  
Okinawa is dependent on economic assistance from Tokyo and will always cling 
to the U.S. base issue as a political expedient in leveraging concessions from the central 
government and, to some degree-- the United States.  As long as the economic standards 
are lower than in mainland Japan, Okinawa will make demands to “lessen the burden,” 
and permanent solutions to issues or problems, which may be  unrealistic goals of 
occidental officials involved in East Asian affairs, will be difficult to find.  If both 
governments fail to grasp and maintain continuity regarding this issue, then policymakers 
may be swayed from the core issues and adopt the perspective of a casual bystander or 
observer.  To the unsuspecting bystander and casual observer in the United States and 
mainland Japan, this political game of kabuki,97 portrays U.S. forces, particularly 
Marines, as an irritant to the security alliance.  Adopting this position may erode and 
damage the real capabilities of the security alliance to deter aggression. 
In sum, a key finding in this thesis is that Okinawans contend that they never had 
a say about the basing of U.S. forces on their small island and, as a result, believe they 
have been marginalized by Tokyo and Washington.  In other words, this is an “arranged 
marriage” between Okinawa and the U.S. military by Tokyo and Washington.  This 
understanding should assist the U.S. side and mainland Japanese to empathize with 
 
96 The 1996 SACO Final Report addressed 27 initiatives in four categories including eight SOFA 
initiatives, three operations and training initiatives, five noise reduction projects and eleven land return 
initiatives. 
97 Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps 
often refers to this process as a kabuki play.  Kabuki is a traditional Japanese popular drama with singing 
and dancing performed in a highly stylized manner.  
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Okinawa’s past experiences, such as the memories of World War II which, for many 
Okinawans is in a perpetual state connected to the U.S. military presence and the 
occasional incidents and accidents. Knowing their past experiences, along with 
Okinawa’s lower economic standards compared with the rest of mainland Japan, will 
enable all concerned to understand why and how Okinawans make demands to “lessen 




















                                                
IV. THE THREATS 
A. TENSION IN THE LAND OF THE MORNING CALM 98
In March 2003, United States Senator Richard Lugar opened a hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and had this to say about regional implications of the 
changing nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula: 
Given North Korea’s extreme isolation, in past years it has been tempting 
to deemphasize its impact on Northeast Asia outside of the Korean 
Peninsula.  Commerce and economic development have moved forward in 
the region almost without reference to North Korea.  But the continuation 
of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will force its neighbors to 
adopt new security strategies-perhaps including the acquisition or 
repositioning of nuclear weapons…  The North Korean nuclear weapons 
program could spark a Northeast Asian arms race that is fed by the 
interlocking anxieties of each of its neighbors.99
At the time of this writing, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North 
Korea) poses the most menacing military and state-sponsored terrorist threat100 to the 
United States and its Asian allies.   
1. Troubled Historical Backdrop and Mounting Animosities 
 After partially unifying Japan, Hideyoshi Toyotomi launched an invasion of 
Korea in May 1592 which was repulsed.  Bruce Cumings’ book, Korea’s Place in the 
Sun, recalls a second attempt by Japan which was launched in 1597 which was also 
repulsed but at great expense to the Korean “Choson” state.  The Koreans aided by the 
Chinese drove off the invading Japanese, but not before the Japanese took the ears of tens 
 
98 The English name for Korea, “Land of the Morning Calm,” is an attempt to lend relationship to 
China or the “Middle Kingdom,” and Japan or the “Land of the Rising Sun.”  This is done in order to 
suggest that the tensions in the Korean peninsula are not contained within the peninsula, but in fact affects 
other countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 
99 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear 
Equation on the Korean Peninsula: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 1st 
sess., 12 March 2003, 3.    
100 North Korea is designated on the U.S. Department of State’s list of terrorist-supporting countries 
for its role in the 1987 Japan Red Army hijacking and bombing of a Korean airliner. See, 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm.  
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of thousands of Korean and Chinese soldiers back to Japan and buried them in Kyoto 
until they were unearthed and returned to Korea as recently as 1994.101   
Many people believe that in order to understand the cultures and people of East 
Asia one must see them through the filter of Confucianism.  Although there is validity in 
this, one need not use Confucian teachings as a crutch to understand how events that 
occurred centuries ago, as explained above, can be relived and agitate relations between 
Koreans and Japanese today.   
Fast-forwarding to the 19th Century one will find the germination of contemporary 
animosities between the Korean people and its neighbors.  As the Meiji restoration 
rapidly brought Japan into prominence, the Japanese became attracted to the European 
and American practice of colonialism.  July 1894 marked the beginning of the Sino-
Japanese War which essentially was a struggle for dominance over Korea.  This war 
ended with the defeat of the Chinese and the sowing of a Meiji genre renovation  in 
Korea at the hands of the Japanese.102   
Within a year of sweeping reforms and the Japanese backing of a palace coup 
which resulted in the murder of the queen and some of her court, Marius B. Jansen points 
out in his book, Japan and China: From War to Peace, “the Japanese and reform became 
odious in the eyes of Korean upper classes.” 103  Jansen also articulates how the Japanese 
mandate for Koreans to cut off the topknot of their hair, in order to follow a path to 
modernization, was met with stiff resistance and served as an anti-Japanese issue for 
Koreans to rally around.  A year later in 1896, after the puppet Korean king sought refuge 
in the Russian legation in Seoul and turned against the Japanese, Russia and Japan 
entered into an agreement to withdraw their troops from Korea.  This was followed by the 
1898 Nishi-Rosen agreement to preserve Korean independence.104  This pause of 
Japanese domination served as a time to undo all that the Japanese “reformed” during 
their domination.   
 
101 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1997), 77. 
102 Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace (Rand McNally, 1975), 116.  
103 Ibid., 118. 
104 Ibid., 119. 
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The end of the 19th Century brought promise for the Koreans in that the Russians 
effectively placed the Japanese in check on the Korean peninsula and blocked any 
aspirations of economic gain through dominance.  The situation however did not sit well 
with the Japanese.  It was foreordained that Russia, which had penetrated Manchuria and 
northern Korea economically, would clash with Japan.  This occurred in the 1904-1905 
Russo-Japanese War, which concluded with the defeat of the Russian naval force at Port 
Arthur and the defeat of the Russian Army in Manchuria.  Japan established a 
protectorate over Korea and began in earnest to restart reform to modernize Korea.  In 
1910, Japan annexed Korea as a colony.105   
Koreans rejected Japanese influence believing that the Japanese were less cultured 
and descendants of Korea.  Basically from the Korean perspective, everything good with 
Japanese culture and society derived from Korean and Chinese influence and therefore 
should interact with Korea in a filial manner.  It offended the Korean standards of justice 
and Confucian filial obligations for the Japanese to press their will onto them. Here lies 
the seeds of contemporary animosities between Korea and Japan which persist today. 
Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack capture the intensifying animosity and 
feeling of inferiority in their book, Korea: Since 1850.  Here they cite a Korean who 
expresses his ambivalent feelings about Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and the 
subsequent forced reintroduction of Japanese influence into Korea: 
As a Korean, I have no special reason for rejoicing over the uninterrupted 
successes of Japan.  Every victory is a nail in the coffin of Korean 
independence… Yet as a member of the Yellow Race, Korea-or rather I- 
feel[s] proud of the glorious successes of Japan.  She has vindicated the 
honor of our race.  No braggart American, no arrogant Briton, no vain 
glorious Frenchman, will be, from now on, able to say that the Yellow 
man is incapable of great things.106
Lone and McCormack explains this expression as ambivalence that has existed 
between Korean and Japanese relations, serving concurrently to provide Koreans with an 
incentive to catch up with their larger neighbor, but also reminding them of their relative 
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economic and technological inferiority.107 This ambivalence would not be limited to 
Korea-Japan relations, as it currently haunts Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) and 
U.S. relations over how to deal with the DPRK and its current nuclear threat.  
 Imperial Japan would exercise Machiavellian control over the Korean peninsula 
for the next 35 years until their defeat in World War II by the Allied Powers.  Annexation 
blackened Japan’s reputation in East Asia;  Lone and McCormack succinctly capture this 
35 year colonial rule:  
..the Chinese press warned of similar Japanese designs on Manchuria, and 
even Japanese intellectuals acknowledged the failure of what for some of 
them had been good intentions.  …contact with Japan had witnessed a mix 
of social chaos but expanding horizons; great wealth for some, 
impoverishment for others; growing violence and, ultimately despair.  For 
better or worse, however, the traditional state and monarchy were no 
more. 108   
Korean and Japanese rivalry which nearly always resulted in Japan’s dominance 
over Korea had lasting effects between them and is evidenced with the strain in relations 
following World War II.  Cumings points out the quota system Japanese colonial leaders 
established for the so-called comfort girls.  Cumings states:  
…to understand the true horror of the “comfort women” issue, why it was 
covered up by Japan and also left alone for so many years by the South 
Korean government; to open up inquiry on this sexual slavery would be to 
find that many women were mobilized by Korean men.  Japan fractured 
the Korean national psyche, pitting Korean against Korean with [lasting] 
consequences… 109
2. Partition and Shifting Animosities Towards the West 
At the urging of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) entered the war in the Pacific by declaring war on Japan on August 08, 1945.110  
As the ink was drying on the Instruments of Surrender in Tokyo Bay, Soviets were 
spreading into the Korean peninsula, driving the Japanese out.  After the United States 
refused a Soviet role in the occupation of Japan, the Truman administration hastily 
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devised a plan to limit the Soviet influence in Korea.  Author and journalist Don 
Oberdorfer stated in a lecture on February 25, 2004 in Monterey, California that the 
United States was focusing on the occupation of Japan and was not prepared to deal with 
the Soviet spread into Korea.  In the evening hours of an August night in 1945, two 
colonels from the War Department, one of whom was Dean Rusk, were instructed to 
draw a line across the Korean Peninsula where the United States and the Soviet Union 
would divide occupation duties.  The Truman administration felt they did not have 
leverage to compel the Soviets to get out of Korea because they were already there, and 
not a single American soldier had even set foot into Japan yet for the Japanese 
occupation.  Oberdorfer further stated that Dean Rusk wrote in his memoirs that he had 
no preparation for the task assigned and that he and the other colonel only had a National 
Geographic map to work on. They looked at the map and attempted to find a natural 
feature to use as a reference for the dividing line but could not find one, so they drew a 
line at the 38th parallel.  The Truman administration subsequently announced that the 
United States would take the surrender of Japanese troops up to the 38th parallel and the 
Soviets down to this line.  Stalin ordered his troops to stop at the 38th parallel as he did 
not want to have difficulties with the United States at that time.  This line was supposed 
to be temporary, however a war fought between 1950-1953 did not change the boundary 
and over a half-century later the peninsula still remains divided.111
The results of that late August night in Washington in 1945 sowed the seeds for 
two states.  North Korea, which espoused the failed Soviet-brand of communism, is now 
limping along under a Korean-brand of Communism or Stalinism (totalitarism).  The 
Soviet Union had installed Kim Il-Sung, a guerilla leader who resisted Japanese colonial 
rule, and founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948.  
The other state is South Korea, which espoused a Korean-brand of the Western ideals of 
democracy and capitalism under the American sphere of influence. The United States 
ushered in and supported Syngman Rhee in the South and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
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was proclaimed on August 15, 1948. 112  Today, South Korea’s GDP per capita is 18 
times North Korea's and equal to the lesser economies of the European Union. 113
The Korean War was the first major Cold War battle.  Kim Il-Sung convinced 
Moscow and Beijing that he could quickly unify the peninsula and launched an attack 
which formally began the war on June 25, 1950.  The North made rapid gains and it 
seemed as if victory was at hand.  The Americans had a hard time working with the 
South.  Animosities were the culprit here in that the South Koreans believed that the 
United States treated them through a Japanese filter and therefore Japan had a hand, 
behind the scenes, in U.S. policy towards the ROK.  Cumings cites conversations that 
General Wedemeyer had with Koreans in that many [Koreans] had turned to the left not 
because they liked communists but because they could not stomach pro-Japanese 
collaborators.  The general was also told that “communists had their hold on people 
because of the memory of their anti-Japanese [positions]; communism here has been 
nurtured with the fertilizer of nationalism.” 114  The war ceased with an armistice on July 
27, 1953 and established the demilitarized zone.  The Korean War further complicated 
international relations between the United States, the United Nations, and Mao’s People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).  China’s introduction to the war strained Sino-U.S. relations 
until the 1970’s and is still a reminder of their position regarding the two Koreas. 
At the immediate conclusion of the Korea War there existed distrust and fierce 
animosities fueled by an orgy of national patriotism both in the North and South.  
Centuries old Korean distrust of the Japanese was strong; there was the loathing of 
Koreans by Japanese; there was the hate of the Japanese by the Russians, and the 
Japanese claim of the Kurile Islands unresolved with the Russians.  The West 
experienced China’s tolerance for North Korea and the international community 
experienced Sino-U.S. and Soviet-U.S. relations entering a new visceral level.  United 
States and ROK relations forged ahead and relations between the United States and the 
DPRK were virtually non-existent as they remain today.  This was the reality of the Cold 
War.   
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There is yet another time of severe tension and strain between ROK and Japan 
relations with the  1974 assassination attempt of President Park Chung-hee by a Korean 
resident of Japan.  The incident resulted in the death of Park’s wife and nearly broke off 
diplomatic relations between the two neighbors as Korea held Japan partly to blame for 
the incident.  The incident was defused with the clandestine intervention of American 
diplomats.115  
Another serious clash which underscores the continuing tensions and festering 
animosities was the killing of two American officers and beatings of other American and 
ROK personnel in Panmunjom’s Joint Security Area in 1976 by North Korean soldiers, 
known as the “tree cutting” incident.  This incident infuriated the Ford Administration 
calling for North Korean blood.  Intelligence confirmed that Kim Il-Sung had prepared 
his country for retaliation from the United States and readied the North for war.  The U.S. 
fearing a general outbreak of war in Korea exercised restraint and eventually got an 
admission of regret from Kim Il-Sung.  The United States did exercise an impressive 
show of force however, and did finish what the American and ROK personnel aimed to 
do the day they were attacked by axe and pipe wielding North Koreans—chop down a 
poplar tree which was obstructing the line of sight of American and ROK sentries.116  
This incident over a tree highlights the depth of tensions and animosity that has prevailed 
since the armistice signing in 1953. 
Tracing these patterns of animosity through history is important and relevant to 
this thesis.  It adds clarity as to why certain issues are so difficult to overcome and 
resolve between the nations which today make-up the six-party talks.  Anecdotes of 
animosity could be further articulated; however, it should be sufficient to have provided 
ample evidence of problems that seek vindication from all nations mentioned above.   
Even though the Korean people as a whole find plenty of energy to indict Japan 
on many past and present transgressions towards Korea, it is the Republic of Korea which 
looked the other way in order to open the path towards trade and economic prosperity 
with Japan.  At the urging of the United States, the ROK sought to normalize relations 
with Japan in the mid-1960’s.  This effort was achieved by Japan’s payment of “grants 
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and loans,” which the ROK accepted as reparations.  Tokyo’s leaders insisted that the aid 
should not be labeled as reparations, as it would appear as if Japan had done something 
wrong.  Nevertheless, other outstanding issues were worked out and a treaty which 
benefited the ROK was ratified by the ROK National Assembly on August 14, 1965.117   
The U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship has been economically strong, but Japan’s 
government leaders have experienced many embarrassing cases of “foot-in-the mouth 
disease,” which has agitated both Koreas and China.  Cumings points out that many 
Japanese leaders cling to the idea that they did wonders for Korea during the colonial 
period, while issuing apology after apology to China, and to a lesser extent Korea, for 
Japan’s wartime behavior, a pattern that continues today.118  One example is when 
Takami Eto, lower-house member and former Japanese Cabinet minister, declared in 
2003 during a speech at a political-party function that estimates suggesting 300,000 
civilians were massacred by the Japanese army in the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937 
and 1938 were “pure fabrication, a big lie.”  Despite these hiccups, relationships between 
Japan and neighboring countries are peacefully thriving and there are signs that Japan and 
the ROK are attempting to bridge their past differences.  Even within military circles 
there is evidence of mutual cooperation.  The Japan-Korea young officers exchange 
program is a way to promote understanding and confidence between the Japanese Ground 
Self- Defense Force and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) through visits at units and 
exchange of opinions between young officers of both forces.  Since 2000, the ROKA 
delegation has visited Japan three times.  119  
Even though past animosities are present in daily life between neighboring 
countries in Northeast Asia, it is the DPRK which is the pressure-cooker that overheats 
and ignites crisis.  The DPRK has no formal relations with the United States but holds a 
permanent mission at the United Nations in New York.  It is here that this thesis will 
examine the current threat that radiates from the DPRK which is complicated by past 
animosities. 
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3. DPRK’s Known Military Capabilities 
The population of the DPRK is reportedly 22,466,481 120 less than half the 
population of the ROK and 1/7th of Japan’s. Yet, the DPRK is estimated to have a 
military half the troop strength of the United States’, which has a population of over 
250,000,000.  The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the fifth-largest armed force in the 
world, just behind the PRC, the United States, Russia and India121 but is not even ranked 
in the top 25 most populous countries in the world.  Additionally, the DPRK’s crippled 
economy is estimated to spend 33.9 percent of its GDP122 on the military, in support of 
the belief in keeping the “Army first.”   
Through unclassified sources there is little data on the conventional capabilities of 
the KPA; however, what is known of the DPRK’s military strength has earned it the 
status of being the most militarized country in the world.123  In the past, the forward 
massing of troops along the demilitarized zone next to South Korea, the large army 
numbering 1.17 million active-duty personnel backed by a ready-reserve force of 7.45 
million,124 improving missile technology, and concentration of artillery aimed at the 
South Korean capital of Seoul were the sources of anxiety.  Today, the larger threat 
looming is the possibility of marrying the North’s developing missile technology with the 
unconfirmed nuclear weapon capability that the DPRK is believed to possess.  This is the 
most troubling threat for the other states which make-up the six nations involved in talks 
with the DPRK.  A volatile regime, which is isolated and diplomatically ostracized, bent 
on practicing brinksmanship to get what it wants; a nation which is economically strained 
with a hungered population, armed with nuclear weapons who would sell the weapons of 
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mass destruction (WMD) to the highest bidder. In 2001, the DPRK earned $560 million 
in missile exports.125
In 1994 the DPRK pushed the United States to the brink of war because it was 
using a Soviet-provided power reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making 
plutonium for nuclear weapons.  Tensions receded with an agreement called the Agreed 
Framework between the United States and the DPRK.  The United States suspected, but 
could not confirm, that the DPRK had enough time and unaccounted for material to have 
made one or two nuclear bombs.  The United States knew that the DPRK had sought 
nuclear weapons technology, and knew that they asked the People’s Republic of China to 
provide it since Mao’s regime successfully exploded their 1st nuclear device in 1964.126  
In October 2002 the United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly confronted Kim Jong-Il’s regime with evidence that the 
North was defying the 1994 Agreed Framework by continuing the uranium-enriching 
program.127   Kim Jong-Il’s regime admitted to the breach and subsequently withdrew 
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, rendered IAEA’s monitoring devices ineffective and 
reopened the nuclear plant to make plutonium.  This marks the beginning of the current 
crisis on the Korean peninsula.   
Pyongyang announced that they restarted the Yongbyon reactor for the purpose of 
producing electricity; however, the five-megawatt reactor is not connected to any power 
grid.128  Complicating this matter is the DPRK’s proven short-range Rodong missiles 
which were test-fired into the Sea of Japan on February 24 and then again March 10, 
2003.  Prior to this, in August 1998 the DPRK had test-launched a Taepodong ballistic 
missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. In December 2003, the United States 
intercepted a ship bound for Yemen loaded with North Korean Scud missiles, proof that 
the DPRK was willing to sell proven military technology.  There is also evidence that the 
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DPRK is working on developing its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the 
Taepodong 2 program with ambitions for it to carry a nuclear warhead.129  All this 
evidence adds clarity to the DPRK’s activities (see Appendix C for a chronology of the 
DPRK’s threatening actions).  The question that was being asked by many U.S. officials 
was how did the North obtain the technology to enrich uranium and produce plutonium?  
This of course is still being investigated but all leads points towards Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Energy Minister, Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), who admitted in early 2004 to selling 
nuclear secrets to North Korea, something North Korea denies. 130
Since the DPRK was confronted with this issue, U.S. officials estimate that the 
North may have up to another five or six nuclear weapons for a total of six to eight, citing 
the removal and unaccountable 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.131  On 
February 4, 2003, the Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State testified 
in front of the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean peninsula and stated: 
North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) 
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery are a fundamental obstacle to that appealing vision for the future.  
They are also a threat to the international community, regional security, 
U.S. interests, and U.S. forces, which remain an integral part of stability in 
the region.  It is time for North Korea to turn away from this self-
destructive course.  They have nothing to gain from acquiring nuclear 
weapons-and much to lose.  Indeed, every day, the people of that country 
are paying a terrible price for these programs in international isolation and 
misspent national resources. 132
It is this potential nuclear problem which poses a serious threat to the United 
States and Northeast Asia.  The Bush administration has succeeded in persuading Japan, 
South Korea, China, and Russia to adopt a common goal in dealing with this threat.  
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Washington Post’s foreign affairs journalist, Philip P. Pan reported that the common goal 
calls for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s 
nuclear programs (civilian and/or military) before engaging into discussions with the 
North for security assurances and economic aid.133  Not quite a pluralistic and resolute 
goal, some evidence suggests that the United States may acquiesce to Seoul’s calls to 
rethink its CVID position and to adopt a “more moderate approach to inducing North 
Korea to change its policies.”134  
Other developments continue to trouble the United States and its allies.  Shortly 
after the close of the 2nd round (February 25-28, 2004) of the six-party talks in Beijing, a 
Japanese newspaper, Sankei, reported on March 10, 2004 that a undisclosed military 
source unveiled a plan in which North Korea may be collaborating with Iran, another 
“axis of evil” country, to construct an underground facility in order to manufacture a 
centrifugal machine for developing enriched uranium in North Korea’s northwestern city 
of Kwisong.135  This is consistent with other reports which suggest that “as the talks drag 
on, North Korea might continue building its nuclear arsenal.”136
4. The Pressures Shaping DPRK’s Actions 
a.  Economy 
 Following the Korean War, the economies of the North and South grew at 
a relatively similar strength and pace, and in some areas, the North’s economy far 
outpaced the South.  But by the early 1970s the DPRK’s prewar Japanese-based 
industries and economy began to wane.  The DPRK turned to Japan and the west to 
purchase turnkey factories,137 and began to incur debt which its economy could not 
repay, estimated to be at $12 billion in 1996 by the CIA.138  By the 1980’s the South’s 
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economic reforms took hold and began to soar past the North’s.  Cumings articulates that 
the collapse of the socialist bloc deprived the North of major markets; however, “unlike 
every other communist state, North Korea never joined COMECON, the socialist would-
be common market.”139  This may account for the North’s economy not going into total 
ruin, but it did deliver a major blow to its economy which is a contributing factor to the 
current nuclear weapons problem.  
 The North’s economy continues to slump despite attempts to rethink its 
autarkic economic system in the 1990’s by welcoming foreign investment.  The North’s 
economic troubles were addressed on June 5, 2003 during a hearing on life inside North 
Korea before the  Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios, 
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development had this to say about North 
Korea’s economy: 
In June of 2002, the regime in North Korea introduced a number of 
economic reforms.  These reforms, which included raising the prices of 
staple food commodities, increasing wage rates, and devaluing the [North 
Korean] Won, were apparently intended to stimulate the agricultural sector 
and promote increased industrial productivity.  Unfortunately, the reforms 
instituted by the regime in North Korea have not improved the economic 
situation in the country.140
b. Energy 
Intimately related to the North’s economy is the need for energy.  Energy 
is a monumental issue in North Korea and is also a major contributing factor for the 
current nuclear weapons problem.  The North has been reluctant to be dependant on oil in 
the past.  Current sources indicate that the DPRK uses petroleum products chiefly for its 
military.  The North, like the South, has no natural reserves of oil to speak of and imports 
nearly all of what it consumes.  In 2001, the CIA estimated that the DPRK consumes 
85,000 bbl/day.  The North does have coal and hydropower as natural resources, and in 
2001 it was estimated by the CIA that 29 percent of the DPRK’s electricity was produced 
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by fossil fuel and the other 71 percent was by hydro.141  Cumings asserts that the North’s 
reluctance to seek energy through petroleum is due to a perception that the United States 
has too much influence on global oil and does not want that influence to negatively affect 
or control the DPRK.  Kim Il-Sung was once quoted, “we are not yet in a position to 
depend on imports….[To do so] means allowing a stranglehold on our jugular.”142  
The DPRK defends its use of the Yongbyon plant in order to address its 
growing energy demands.  The DPRK’s deputy foreign minister, Kim Gye Gwan stated:  
we do have an atomic power industry which has a lot of purposes, and we 
cannot give it up.  We need this nuclear energy in different aspects.  We 
need it in medical areas.  We need it in agricultural areas as well as for 
electricity.143  We cannot afford to forgo all these activities. 144   
Figure 2 demonstrates the energy disparity between the DPRK and neighboring countries. 
 PRC 
 ROK 
Figure 2.   View of the DPRK at N
(From: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/dprk-dark
                                                 
141 CIA, “The World Fact book,” CIA Online [home page
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.htm
142 Cumings, 426. 
143 The rail system in the North is electrified, as are city b
       144 Philip P. Pan, Washington Post. “Washingtonpost.co
Plans.  [home page on-line]; available from http://www.w
Offer on Nuclear Plans; Internet; accessed 6 March 2004. 
  
58 DPRK 
  JAPAN 
ight from Space 
.htm; Internet; accessed 12 August 2004) 
 on-line]; available from  
l; Internet; accessed 27 February 2004. 
uses and subways. 
m” N. Korea Retreats From Offer on Nuclear 
ashingtonpost.com/ N. Korea Retreats From 
59 
                                                
c. Food  
Another strain for the DPRK is the food shortage which has plagued the 
North for years now.  Prolonged excessive military spending has contributed to food 
storages and deteriorating living conditions.  International food aid has stemmed the trend 
toward mass starvation since the mid-1990’s; however, Oberdorfer suspects between 1-2 
million people have perished from starvation in the last decade.145  The rest of the 
population has been victimized by malnutrition.  The United States has led the way by 
contributing food to the DPRK, first seen in large scale by the Clinton Administration 
and continued with the Bush Administration.146  President Bush is sympathetic to the 
North Korean people and is committed not to punish them as a means to oust Kim Jong-Il 
and his regime.  President Bush has affirmed his position not to use food as a bargaining 
chip in the current nuclear weapons problem with the DPRK as long as the food is 
reaching the masses and not going straight to the DPRK military. 147
The benevolence the United States has demonstrated through food aid to 
the people of the DPRK is distorted and manipulated by the Kim regime in order to 
control the masses.  In a case of “information contamination,” Natsios stated in his 
testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on June 05, 
2003 that starting in 1997, the United States labeled each bag (est. 30 million total at that 
time) of American food with a message written in Korean, “gift of the people of the 
United States.” Refugees have since reported that the Kim regime explained the 
American food aid as reparations for damages caused during the [Korean] war.148  This is 
an attempt of damage control by the Kim regime.  They see information such as the 
above message on the food bags as “information contamination” since it is contrary to the 
information the regime communicates to the masses and therefore calls for an explanation 
which complements the “party line.”  
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In March 2003, the ROK pledged to send 1.3 million tons of rice to the 
North over a three-year period.  Despite the U.S and ROK aid , the North is losing other 
sources of aid.  Japan, the second largest economy in the world has introduced sanctions 
on the DPRK in February 2004, a move which is supported by the United States.  
Approximately 80 percent of the Japanese public supported economic sanctions on North 
Korea according to a Jiji Press Company poll.149  Japan revised the Japanese Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law allowing Japan to independently impose 
economic sanctions on the DPRK.  These initiatives became law on June 14, 2004 and 
are known as the “port entry ban” law which essentially blocks North Korean ships from 
entering Japanese ports.150  This move was done in part to apply pressure to the North, 
but enforcing this law appears to be contingent on the progression of the six-party talks 
and further threatening actions taken by the DPRK.151  Japan has also increased 
smuggling surveillance at its ports.  Japan’s Sankei newspaper reported on March 09, 
2004 that Japanese police have identified the Japanese southwestern city of Fukuoka as a 
key smuggling route for North Korea.  Investigations have repeatedly led Japanese 
authorities to Fukuoka’s port as a means of smuggling out stolen 4WD vehicles, missile-
related components, used bicycles and household electrical appliances, and trailer beds 
which are suspected to be converted into mobile missile launching pads by the DPRK. 
This type of smuggling, especially that of used bicycles and household electrical 
appliances, are believed to be further signs of a strained North Korean economy.  
Additionally, Japanese authorities suspect pro-DPRK Korean residents in Japan of 
facilitating the smuggling. 152
All of the above pressures are directly linked to the current nuclear 
weapons problem being experienced.  Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington, DC, wrote for the British Broadcasting 
Company (BBC) News Online:  
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[one could surmise that North Korea’s] nuclear program is merely a 
bargaining chip to be traded away to extract political and economic 
concessions from the U.S.-a kind of atomic “trick or treat.”153   
The United States has responded to this threat by insisting on North Korea complying 
with the calls for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of their nuclear 
programs, a different position than that of 1994.   
These contributing factors to the nuclear weapons problem are being used as a 
terrorist tool by Kim’s regime.  Since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK has been less 
predictable and has not projected a clear vision for its future.  This waning vision has 
triggered the DPRK to rely more on brinksmanship as its foreign policy.  The above 
problems fuel their motive for this type of desperate action. 154  Their actions mimic those 
of a guerilla or rebel group chipping away at a larger power by presenting menacing 
threats, in the case of the DPRK—nuclear weapons with obscure intentions to use or sell.  
These actions are clearly indicative of a terrorist state.   
5. Aspects of China’s Position 
China’s influence on this issue is larger than the information available for mass 
consumption leads one to realize, as the popular media tends to gloss over China’s role.  
The media projects China as simply hosting the six-party talks, first in August 2003, then 
in February 2004, and in June 2004.  There are underlying reasons for this though.  
Koreans see themselves as being cultural kin of China and believe China to be their 
Asian big brother who understands Korea and is more likely to be trusted.  China and 
both Koreas also have a relationship that is relatively free of intense animosities.   
Beijing however has its own reasons for ensuring the DPRK is nuclear weapons 
free.  Unlike the United States, which characterizes the DPRK’s actions as irrational and 
crazy, China assesses the DPRK’s posturing as a reaction towards their fears and 
vulnerabilities.  Instead of adopting a firm and inflexible position towards the DPRK, 
China, along with South Korea, usually will “respond to them by consulting with each 
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other and trying to devise means that will cause the DPRK to alter its way of thinking and 
acting.”155 The instability that the DPRK continues to perpetuate in Asia may have a 
dampening effect on the economy and trade between China and its Asian and Western 
trade partners.  China has a lot to gain with a peaceful outcome of the six-party talks.  
Koreans believe that the Chinese can be a better mediator and the Chinese welcome this 
role as it seeks to “re-Asianize” Asia with Beijing as its leader.  There is evidence of this 
as the Republic of Korea has stronger economic relations with the Chinese than with the 
Japanese, which is the 2nd largest economy in the world.  Additionally, the tendency 
towards the normalization of ROK-PRC relations demonstrates that even though the 
ROK is vehemently anticommunist, they are framing their foreign policy as not to be 
anti-Chinese.  Another issue which the Chinese wish to keep in check is the 
hemorrhaging of North Korean refugees flowing into its borders.  Beijing wishes to stem 
this problem by stabilizing the problems in the DPRK. 156
The United States government has been very conscious of the growing influence 
China is experiencing in Asia and has worked towards balancing this influence.  The 
maturing influence could embolden Beijing to act more forcefully towards Taiwan.  As 
recently as January 2004, the United States’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Richard Myers embarked on an Asian trip which included the PRC, Japan, 
Australia, and Mongolia.  General Myers had frank discussions with his Chinese 
counterpart regarding the mounting Chinese missile build-up opposite Taiwan. 
Additionally, Myers signaled his intent on building stronger military-to-military ties 
between the United States and the PRC.  General Myers was quoted:  
…the better the American and Chinese militaries know each other, the less 
chance there will be for either side to “miscalculate or misunderstand” 
each other if there are incidents in the future. 157
 
155 Ibid. 
156 Edward A. Olsen, “Government and Security in Korea” (lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, 3 March 2004 and “Trilateral (U.S., ROK, Japan) Cooperation in the Resolution of 
the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Pacific Focus, Volume XIX No.2, (Fall 2004). 
157 Jim Garamone, “China, U.S. Making Progress on Military Relations,” American Forces 
Information Service (2004), [e-journal]; http://www.dod.mil/news/Jan2004/n01152004_200401152.html; 
Internet; accessed 17 January 2004. 
63 
                                                
 Myers had been referring to the April 2001 U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft colliding with a 
Chinese F-8 aircraft over the East China Sea.  Essentially, Myers delivered the Bush 
administration’s message that, “for sustained progress and prosperity you need a stable 
and secure environment.”158 
6. President George W. Bush’s Administration 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has pursued a 
strong and determined policy of dealing with terrorists and protecting the United States 
and its interests.  The Bush administration has accomplished a lot in making the world 
safer.  The Taliban is no longer in control of Afghanistan and democratic elections were 
held there on October 9, 2004.  Iraq has been liberated from a brutal dictator who had 
been dealing out menacing threats to the United States since 1991 and returned to the 
people of Iraq a sovereign state on June 28, 2004.  Libya, a country within an extended 
“axis of evil” has agreed to abandon its WMD program and open its facilities to 
international inspectors.  It can be argued that Muammar Gaddafi was convinced of 
Bush’s resolve to make the United States and the world safer and capitulated.   
This is all evidence that the United States is speaking a new language that other 
countries understand.  Unfortunately, it is not the language of diplomacy and 
negotiations, but action and force.  The United States has been plagued by a reputation of 
not having the resolve to stick things out when the situation becomes difficult.  Many 
countries believe that the way to get the United States “out of its affairs” is to send a few 
American troops home in body bags.  Unfortunately, some of these perceptions were 
proven true during several events in the 1990’s such as the smashing of the Kurdish 
uprising in Iraq, and the failed humanitarian efforts in Somalia and Haiti.  The events of 
9/11 have made the United States more resolute and have consequently surprised many 
rogue nations, such as Libya.   
It is plausible to infer that Kim Jong-Il has taken the U.S. led invasion into Iraq as 
a matter of unfinished business from the former Bush administration159 and that the 
current Bush administration will not stop there, but will finish what was started in 1950 in 
Korea.  This may lend weight to an argument that the actions of the current Bush 
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administration has triggered panic in Kim’s regime which has degraded and perhaps 
engendered the current nuclear weapons problem.  It could be argued that in order for 
Kim to keep the United States out of the DPRK it has to advance the idea that they 
possess nuclear weapons.  
7. Japan: Nuclear Weapons Concerns and Abductions 
  The title of this section captures the primary issues Japan holds with the DPRK.  
These issues constitute another variable which contribute to the complexity of the overall 
problem radiating out of the Korean peninsula.  The Japanese have other troubling issues 
such as the North’s firing of Taepodong missiles over Japan in 1998 and the “mystery 
ship” incident that occurred off Amami Island in 2001, both prove to be security 
problems for Japan.  However, it is the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens by 
North Koreans and the mounting nuclear missile threat that monopolizes the Japanese 
media.   
Prime Minister Koizumi and other Japanese government officials have heard the 
Japanese call for resolution on these issues and are supported by the U.S. government 
which has unofficially called these events acts of terrorism.  Tokyo has repeatedly 
asserted that both these issues must be resolved on the truth and without glossing over the 
facts or diplomatic normalization between the two countries will not be realized anytime 
soon.160  The issue of abductions came to light in October 2002 when five abducted 
Japanese citizens were permitted a brief visit to Japan and ended up staying, but their 
eight family members were left behind and not permitted by Pyongyang to reunite.  
Additionally, there are ten other Japanese victims that are uncounted for.  Koizumi went 
to Pyongyang on May 22, 2004 and secured the release of most of the remaining family 
members,161  but the fate of the other ten is still undetermined. These developments 
coincided with the DPRK’s admission to restarting a nuclear arms program. 
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8. South Korea’s Ambivalence 
A sticky issue which has caused disagreement between Seoul and Washington is 
how to deal with the North Korean brand of foreign policy.  The Republic of Korea has 
been favoring a more fraternal and reconciliatory approach, which for the United States, 
is  reminiscent of failed appeasement policies of the past as this was specifically 
attempted in 1994 with the DPRK. 
The ROK’s defiance towards the United States’ firm CVID policy with the DPRK 
is a risk and complicates the discussion process.  Officially, they have agreed with the 
United States and other participants in the six-party talks that the DPRK must first ensure 
the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of their nuclear programs (civilian 
and/or military) before engaging into discussions with the North for security assurances 
and economic aid.  However, many ROK officials continue to call upon the United States 
for concessions towards the DPRK, undermining the whole process. 
The ambivalence South Korea has demonstrated above is superficial compared to 
the more complicated strife South Korea wrestles with in regards to their northern 
brothers.  Koreans are torn on wanting to unite the peninsula and become one again.  
Both Koreas have officially grappled with the issues of unification since the early 1970’s.  
This concept has evolved into what is seen as a destined goal and instituted with 
Ministries of Unification in both Koreas.  The South first called this policy towards 
unification the Sunshine Policy, and is now relabeled the Policy of Peace and Prosperity, 
by the South Korean President—Roh Moo-Hyun.  The North’s top foreign policy focus is 
in fact on inter-Korea issues and the unification agenda also.162  Where the South 
diverges from the North is on the issue of the economic effects of absorbing the North.  
The South paid close attention to the difficulties experienced by West Germany in 
absorbing the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall and has been sobered by the thought of 
taking in over 20 million hungry Northerners.  Additionally, journalist Michael Paranzino 
asserts that the South has developed a case of the Stockholm Syndrome, where an 
abductee gradually comes to identify themselves with their captor.  Parazino asserts that 
after years of being in the gun-sights of the North, the Southern leadership has been 
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“traumatized” into adopting a safe course of appeasement, rather than a more firm 
course.163  
South Koreans also have mixed views on U.S. presence in the South as they 
blame the United States as the biggest obstacle towards unification, while others see the 
United States as a necessary evil in order to keep Northern aggression in check.  This 
ambivalence by and large can be linked to age.  The difference in age and past 
experiences is the most salient difference in views towards U.S.-ROK relations and 
positions towards the DPRK.164  Older South Koreans, who experienced the communist 
insurgency of the North and the aid of Americans to halt the Northern takeover of the 
South 50 years ago are in favor of U.S. presence.165  As for the younger generation of 
South Koreans, who have not fought for freedom as their parents and grandparents did, 
they favor more radical and nationalist views which are hostile towards the United States.  
This divorce in views between the age groups has caused the reordering of international 
politics in South Korea and the consequential ambivalent posture towards the United 
States which is a key factor in shaping the global transformation of U.S. forces. 
9. U.S.-ROK-JAPAN Defensive Deterrent 
This section is an attempt to assess the conventional military actions taken by the 
United States, ROK, and Japan in response to the threats projected from North Korea.  
The United States maintains bilateral security relationships with both the ROK and Japan.  
All three nations share similar security concerns and are economically connected to each 
other.  A security threat to one of these nations will have consequential effects upon the 
others, and it is for this “domino effect” that these three nations cooperate towards 
regional security and harmony. 
In maintenance of the bilateral security treaty the United States has with South 
Korea, conducted combined military exercises annually.   Major exercises such as BEAR 
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HUNT and TEAM SPIRIT, which began shortly after the “tree cutting” incident in 1976, 
were cancelled following the 1994 Agreed Framework as a concession to the North. 
Pyongyang saw those major annual exercises as a threat and provocative aggressive act.  
As a consequence and as a gesture to demonstrate no aggressiveness by the United States 
and ROK, those exercises ceased.  However, other exercises between the United States 
and ROK are still conducted regularly, but at a toned-down scale.  
In April 2003, the Bush administration began to send signals to Pyongyang and 
other hostile nations throughout the globe.  As the war in Iraq entered its second week, 
the United States sent stealth fighters to South Korea to participate in training exercises 
which were to remain there upon conclusion of the exercises.  Additionally, as U.S. 
forces were operating in Afghanistan, combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa, 
participating in peacekeeping operations in East Timor, participating in clandestine 
operations in the Philippines, operating with NATO in Kosovo, and fighting a major war 
in Iraq, other U.S. forces continued to execute regularly scheduled joint and combined 
exercises throughout Asia, mainly with Japan-based forces and with elements based in 
the United States.  Some of the larger exercises included BALIKATAN in the Philippines 
and COBRA GOLD in Thailand.  These exercises sent strategic messages that the United 
States was force to be reckoned with, in that it had the capability to protect its interests 
worldwide and simultaneously.  
The United States continued to posture itself with respect to North Korea by 
announcing the repositioning of some of its 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, and 
moving them farther away from North Korean artillery range and, having some of them 
participate in OIF with the U.S. Central Command.  As recently as February 22, 2004, the 
U.S. Pacific Command has moved six B-52 Stratofortress bombers with 300 support 
personnel from North Dakota to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.  This was the first 
time since the Vietnam War that Guam had a continuous B-52 presence on its U.S. bases.  
Former commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces, General William Begert was quoted that 
such moves are a way of “buying-down risk.” 166
The American troops stationed in South Korea are predominately Army and Air 
Force assets which form the bulk of United States Forces Korea (USFK).  Hours away  
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from any potential incident in Korea are the American forces based in Japan which 
constitute United States Forces Japan (USFJ), a mix of Marine, Navy, Air Force and 
Army troops totaling about 50,000 personnel many of which stationed on the island of 
Okinawa.  These forces are able to intervene in hostilities on the Korean peninsula by 
agreements made in 1969 in the Nixon-Sato summit in Washington.  Japan recognized 
the vital role U.S. forces on Okinawa played in regional security and agreed that should 
an attack occur against South Korea, the security of Japan would be “seriously affected.”  
Prime Minister Sato stated:  
…therefore, should an occasion arise for the United States forces in such 
an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military 
combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the government 
of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position 
positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition. 167   
 Victor Cha asserts in his book, Alignment Despite Antagonism, that this statement 
was the essence of a “Korean clause” that sprang out of the Okinawa reversion 
discussions and marked a first example of close cooperation between Japan and the ROK 
in that Japan recognized a direct security link between the two countries.168 Cha stated 
that the “Korean clause,” “granted the United States unconditional access to the 
Okinawan bases in the event of renewed hostilities against the ROK.” This is evidenced 
today as the preeminent U.S. expeditionary force in Japan is the III Marine Expeditionary 
Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa with smaller elements in mainland Japan, Hawaii 
and South Korea, and conducts regular exercises with the ROK military.  One of the 
missions of III MEF is going to the defense of South Korea which can have the bulk of  
its 22,000 man force in Korea within two days, see Figure 3.  
Since the events of September 11, 2001, Japan has also recognized the need to 
take more ownership in its own security with respect to threats from North Korea.  
Japan’s markets have been very sensitive towards regional threats in recent years.  
Following every test missile firing by the DPRK,  Tokyo responded negatively.  With the 
urging and support of the United States, Japan has taken steps to assert more leadership 
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and share in the responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability by 
deploying its Self-Defense Forces overseas.  But in addressing the North Korean threat, 
Japan has recently taken steps to purchase PAC-3 surface-to-air guided missiles.  
Additionally, Japan is addressing the gaps in its security with tracking North Korean 
Rodong missiles and plans for shooting them down with ground-based radar and missile 
defense technology in partnership with the United States.  At the time of this writing, the 
Self-Defense Force’s ground radar cannot track ballistic missiles; however, the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force’s American-made Aegis ships can track Rodong missiles 
but cannot shoot them down.169
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Figure 3.   III MEF Time-Distance to Korea 
                           (From: III MEF Command Brief of May 2001) 
B. THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF CHINA 
Assessing the potential long term threat to the region and global affairs of a 
growing China is accomplished by examining “China’s economic emergence and how 
that translates into comprehensive national power.”170  It has become apparent that near 
to mid-term threats, such as terrorism and the nuclear threat of the DPRK, are having a 
stronger influence on the constitutional debate in Japan and the shaping of the U.S. 
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military.  As such, China’s influence or perceived threat will be addressed only in general 
terms in this thesis and not in detail as was done for the DPRK.   
1. China’s Superheated Economy 
Evidence of China’s growth and influence is in the expanding Chinese economy 
which Citigroup predicts will grow a staggering 8.5 percent in 2004.  Signs of slowdown 
in some areas of the Chinese economy can be found due to administrative controls 
Beijing has implemented.  Lending, investment, and consumption, which rose to 3.8% in 
April 2004 and is predicted to keep rising in 2004, are all factors which are contributing 
to a strong and fast growing Chinese economy.171  It was noted in a statement made by 
Senator Richard G. Lugar, “…that at current growth rates, the size of China’s economy 
will double every 10 years.”172  Consumption of natural resources such as oil has already 
strained relations between Beijing and Tokyo and China’s large population is partly 
blamed for contributing to the 50 percent increase in gasoline prices in the United States 
in 2004.  The Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported that China halted petroleum 
exports to Japan from its Daqing oil field in Heilongjiang Province because Japan refused 
to pay a price hike. This is the first halt of oil exports from China to Japan since 1973.173  
Then, in March 2004, China replaced Japan as the second largest importer of oil behind 
the United States.174  The Yomiuri Shimbun also reported that Japan and China are also 
competing to win routes for construction of oil pipelines from Russia and eastern Siberia.  
In response to China’s rapid economic growth Japan will reduce its assistance to Beijing 
by 20% a year based on 2004’s aid of 96.7 billion yen or $896 million USD.175    
It is China’s growing economy with its increasing appetite for oil and other 
natural resources which is the cause for concern as is already evidenced between China 
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and Japan.  Towards securing these resources, it is inevitable that China’s military will be 
the beneficiary of China’s growing economy as it is destined to modernize.176  It is 
therefore apparent that competition for contracts and price hikes are not the only sources 
of friction, age old territorial disputes are becoming more sensitive and gaining more 
regional attention.   
2. Territorial Disputes 
Territorial disputes over islands and sea lanes in East Asia continue to plague 
many states.  There is an ongoing problem with the many claims over the Spratly Islands, 
especially between the Republic of the Philippines and China.  There are unresolved 
issues between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands and also between Japan and the 
ROK regarding Ullung Island.  There are even territorial disputes between China and the 
ROK.  These disputes make the news occasionally and are largely overshadowed by the 
larger dispute between China and Taiwan; however, territorial disputes between two 
major powers such as China and Japan could rapidly escalate in a time of heightened 
tensions.   
In March 2004 there was such a case which commanded media attention in East 
Asia when Chinese protestors illegally entered Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Island      
group (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) which is claimed by Japan and China.   This was a 
time that oil prices were being contested between the two states, Japanese aid to China 
had receded, Chinese outrage over Japanese businessmen going on a sex tour in Zhuhai 
city, and outrage over a controversial skit by Japanese students in Xian City, in addition 
to the Chinese irritation of the perceived insensitivity of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine177 all fueled a new round of anti-Japanese feelings in China.178   
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On March 24, 2004 seven crew members of a Chinese boat went ashore at Uotsuri 
Island, which Japan, China, and even Taiwan claim sovereignty over.  These crew 
members (Chinese nationals) went to protest China’s claim over the island and were 
promptly arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard.  It is difficult to gauge if the viewpoints 
and actions of these seven protestors represent a large portion of the Chinese populace as 
one of the arrested protestors was previously arrested in August 2001 for vandalizing 
government property at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, suggesting that these activists are 
professionals dedicated to their anti-Japanese views.179  Nevertheless, this was the first 
time Japanese authorities arrested Chinese nationals for landing on the Senkaku Islands 
and resulted in a backlash in Beijing as protestors burned Japanese flags in front of the 
Japanese Embassy and prompted Koizumi to publicly state that the Senkaku Islands are 
the sovereign territory of Japan and called upon the Government of the PRC to prevent 
future occurrences.180  Even Washington inserted itself into the quarrel by announcing 
that “the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.” 181  The act of 
seven “professional” protestors, possibility acting independently, irritated three nations 
and received media attention for weeks, such is the sensitivities permeating between 
China and Japan and the United States.  Incidents such as this with the United States 
backing Japan is what causes China to view the U.S-Japan Security Alliance as one 
aimed against China. 
3. View of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
The incident on Senkaku Islands is not the first time the United States has asserted 
itself in support of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance to the chagrin of the PRC.  In April 
2001 a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft, which departed from Kadena Air Base in 
Okinawa, collided with a Chinese fighter-jet in the skies over the East China Sea 
resulting in the crash of the Chinese plane and death of its pilot and the emergency 
landing of the U.S. Navy plane on Hainan Island.  This incident resulted in high tensions 
between Beijing and Washington as responsibility for the incident was levied upon each 
other.  This incident caused Beijing to question the activities of U.S. forces in East Asia 
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and the surveillance of the Chinese littorals as infringing on the sovereignty of China and 
acting in a provocative manner. 
Incidents such as the April 2001 “EP-3 incident”, the March 2004 “Senkaku 
Islands incident”, and lesser known incidents such as a Chinese Navy 2,100-ton Ming-
class submarine navigating in waters near Japan in November 2003 in which it was first 
spotted by a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and reported to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 
Force,182 are cases which reinforce Beijing’s view that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
in its contemporary structure is aimed at the PRC.183  This will be a challenge which 
must be carefully managed as the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is transformed and is 
complicated by the mounting positioning of missiles opposite Taiwan.  Although the 
Chinese may see the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance aimed at them, this study finds that the 
larger challenge to be overcome is to convince the Japanese people that a security 
alliance between the United States and Japan is still required should Korea unify 
peacefully and the Japanese Constitution revised to allow for collective defense without 
deteriorating relations with Beijing.  This is a task that will be articulated in Chapter V as 
terrorism and a fledgling Japanese military will still require the presence of U.S. forces 
and the U.S. nuclear deterrence to contribute to the security and stability of the region for 
the foreseeable future.       
4. The Taiwan Straits 
The U.S-Japan Security Alliance and the U.S. nuclear deterrence is best measured 
by the effects it has had in promoting an obscure U.S. one-China policy, which has been 
defined by three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), all of which 
do not recognize China’s claim to Taiwan but do not support Taiwan’s goal to claim 
independence.184  The issue of Taiwan, “which from the PRC perspective is always the 
 
182 Asahi  (Tokyo), 05 June 2004. 
183 Geostrategy. “White House Upgrades U.S.-Japan Security Partnership,” Geostrategy Online 
[home page on-line]; available from http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-
direct/secure/2004/4_27/ne.asp; Internet; accessed 22 April 2004. 
184 The Heritage Foundation. “Two Congressmen Look at “One China,” The Heritage Foundation 
Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/h1821.cfm; Internet; accessed 7 April 2004, 5. 
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most sensitive issue in [the U.S.-PRC] relationship,”185 goes back to the 1949 Chinese 
civil-war where China sees the issue of Taiwan as a quest to preserve their union just as 
the United States fought a civil war in the 19th Century for the same purpose.  It was not 
until 1978 when the United States normalized relations with China that the United States 
passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which enables the United States to prevent the forcible 
reunification of Taiwan with the PRC by supporting Taiwan’s democracy and defense 
capabilities.  It has been communicating the same position now for over two decades.  
That position is maintaining the status quo.186  Even though China has deployed about 
450 short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan and held naval exercises in waters near 
Taiwan, it has not moved against the island the PRC calls a “renegade province.”  The 
United States’ position with Taiwan may be put to the test should the recently reelected 
and nearly assassinated Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian go forth with a referendum 
in 2006 to declare independence and establishing a new constitution in 2008.   It is public 
knowledge that China will declare war against Taiwan should Taipei declare 
independence and it is most likely that the United States will go to Taiwan’s aid. 187   
If the United States is successful in restraining Taiwan’s ambitions, then it is the 
growing economic influence of China, one that President Bush has called a “strategic 
competitor,” that may test the United States’ one-China policy and force Washington to 
adopt a less ambiguous position, one which may cause instability in the region.  For now, 
Washington has been performing preventative maintenance by counseling Beijing on the 
erosion of democracy in Hong Kong and the anxieties Taiwanese have in seeing this as 
their future should Taiwan decide to join the PRC.  This effort may help ease the 
mounting tensions between Taipei and Beijing and serve the United States’ goal to 
maintain the status quo which is in keeping with Japan’s goal of regional stability and 
 
185 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the Effects and Consequences of an 
Emerging China: Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the  Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 19 March 2003, 7.    
186 Gerrit W. Gong, ed. Taiwan Strait Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-U.S. Policies in the New Century 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000) 26.  
187 The Heritage Foundation. “Two Congressmen Look at “One China,” The Heritage Foundation 
Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/ 
h1821.cfm; Internet; accessed 7 April 2004, 6. 
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maintaining non-governmental working relations with Taiwan by espousing neither a 
“two China policy” nor a “one China policy.”188
C. CONCLUSION 
The transformation of the U.S. military, debate about constitutional revision in 
Japan, and potential redefining of the U.S.-Japan alliance are processes that are indicative 
of the importance world powers attach to shaping national institutions for an 
unpredictable future in global affairs.  Near to mid-term threats and the assessment of the 
current international situation are more comprehensible and has been a barometer to 
gauge the directions and speed for the processes of conversion for those institutions.  It 
has been in this context that this chapter assessed the near and mid-term threats to Japan 
and U.S. security and interests in Northeast Asia.   As the United States and Japan 
continue to work with the other nations concerned with resolving the nuclear weapons 
threat posed by the DPRK, paying careful attention to the PRC is prudent. Conduits to 
China’s institutions and society are required in order to keep open windows to the 
development of their military, economic sector, and governmental policies.  This is 
important, in part, to ensure that Beijing will adhere to international norms and laws 
when it achieves superpower status. 
In closing, past animosities still festering, the DPRK’s faltering economy, the 
need for energy and food, the ROK’s ambivalence, the United States led war on 
terrorism, and unresolved issues with Japan all complicate the situation.  The third round 
of six-party talks held on June 21-22, 2004 in Beijing failed to produce the results they 
sought.189  North Korea and other nations kicked this issue down the road further until 
after the U.S. Presidential election in November 2004.  National-level elections were held 
in South Korea, Japan and the United States in 2004, and all parties now know who they 
are dealing with for the foreseeable future.  It is unlikely that this issue will be further 





188 Sankei (Tokyo), 4 April 2004. 
































V. THE WAY AHEAD:  OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON     
AND TOKYO 
A. SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE CHAPTERS 
The preceding chapters sought to examine how and why Japan is debating and 
studying the issue of constitutional revision by examining the effects of 9/11 and Japan’s 
goal of participating more in global affairs and its own security.  In doing so, key 
variables such as the “burden” of Okinawa, where the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan are 
concentrated, have been examined and the near to mid-term threats to United States and 
Japanese security and interests have been thoroughly articulated.  Henceforth, this 
chapter will provide a policy-prescriptive “way ahead” for U.S. military transformation in 
Japan, specifically Okinawa, which considers Japan’s constitutional progression along 
with concerns on Okinawa, in order to address the threats in East Asia.       
B. PREMISE FOR ACTIONABLE OPTIONS 
The actionable options asserted below are predicated on the current 
transformational processes both nations are undergoing and the DPRI process which 
informally joins them.  It is my assertion that the below options can be the outcome of the 
DPRI discussions.  While this chapter may not cover all the points that require 
adjustment, I believe it covers the most pressing ones.  My premises for the following 
options are broken down into six points.  First, both the U.S. and Japan concur on the 
threats to the national interests of both nations and that a strong security alliance must be 
maintained to guard against those threats and maintain stability in East Asia.  
Second, U.S. forces in Japan must be considered in strategic terms but smaller 
ways towards becoming better neighbors, through localized efforts, should not be 
dismissed as insignificant contributions to the overall maintenance of the alliance.  In 
order to be better understood and accepted among the communities in Japan, U.S. forces 
must re-think their actual presence and weight them against the impact and sensitivities 
of their host nation neighbors.   
Third, U.S. Marines are not an irritant to the alliance but a key to its success in 
promoting stability to the region and giving would-be belligerents pause to act 
aggressively.  Members of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of 
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Defense stated that the physical presence of Marines in Japan has proven effective in 
deterring aggression.  Japanese officials have also echoed this assessment.  Mr. Hideki 
Yamaji, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy 
Studies Program, The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, stated that U.S. Marines 
are not an irritant and that their presence have added to the stability of East Asia and 
towards building confidence between the military services of East Asian nations.  Mr. 
Yamaji further stated, “stability in East Asia cannot be maintained without the U.S. 
Marine Corps.”190  The First Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Embassy 
of Japan in Washington, DC, Takehiro Funakoshi stated in an interview on May 12, 2004 
that the Government of Japan recognizes that the physical presence of U.S. Marines plays 
an important role in the deterrence of aggression.”  Mr. Funakoshi added that GOJ is not 
wedded to the role of each individual service but more so to the overall capabilities of 
USFJ, with or without a Marine Corps.  The Government of Japan’s bottom-line is that it 
does not want to reduce the overall deterrence or operational effectiveness of USFJ.191  
The reason asserted with unique continuity as to why the Marines are not an irritant but a 
key contributor is the unique and proven capabilities a Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) offers to the security alliance.  Grant Newsham captures the various expressions 
of a MEF contributing to the security alliance as follows:  
…modern war is a combined arms activity.  The most effective and least 
costly approach combines air, ground, and sea capabilities.  Each can do 
what the other cannot.  III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on 
Okinawa and mainland Japan is the only immediately deployable ground 
force in a massive operational area stretching from Hawaii to Africa. In 
war and other contingencies (especially humanitarian intervention, disaster 
relief, peacekeeping operations, and noncombatant evacuations) you must 
have people on the ground to seize terrain, to engage enemy forces, or to 
aid and assist people.  This cannot be accomplished by simply sending 
ships to cruise offshore or planes to fly overhead. 192
 
190 Hideki Yamaji, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies 
Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC and former Chief of the SOFA Section in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Government of Japan, interview on 12 May 2004. 
191 Funakoshi, 12 May 2004.  
192 Grant Newsham, “Marines on Okinawa are Indispensable,” Sentaku Magazine, August 2002.    
Lieutenant Colonel Grant Newsham is an East Asia Regional Affairs Officer for Marine Forces Pacific, and 
assigned as a reservist to the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo.  He is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and was 
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Fourth, while the United States is nudging Japan to participate more in its own 
security and to become more involved internationally and, as long as both Koreas move 
ahead with plans to unify and become a lesser threat towards stability in East Asia, there 
should be an anticipation for calls in Japan to lessen the U.S. military footprint in Japan 
and equalize the security burden-sharing.  Mr. Yamaji asserts that it would be impolitic in 
Japan if actions to adjust the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are not taken in light of these 
developments.  This is especially true in Okinawa where polls consistently demonstrate 
that more reduction, albeit moderate reduction, with respect to U.S. military presence are 
desired.193   
Fifth, closely related to the fourth premise and key to continued effective U.S. 
presence in Okinawa is the need for a formal process of reconciliation between Tokyo 
and Okinawa.  On May 19, 2002, during the Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of 
the Reversion of Okinawa, U.S. Ambassador Howard Baker thanked Okinawans for 
shouldering the burden of U.S. military bases for many years.194  His thanks was not 
enthusiastically welcomed as Okinawans contend that they do not want thanks for 
something they claimed to have no say.  Okinawans responded that the U.S. military 
bases were forced upon them by mainland Japan which continues to perpetuate a “not-in-
my-backyard” position regarding the basing of U.S. forces in Japan.  There must be a 
defining moment where Tokyo reconciles with Okinawa for shouldering the weight of the 
U.S. military presence in Japan and acknowledges the contributions Okinawans have 
made towards the maintenance of security for Japan.  Japan, and the rest of Asia, could 
learn how to take the first step towards reconciliation from Europe as Germany’s 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroedor attended the World War II D-Day commemoration at 
Normandy, France on June 6, 2004.          
Sixth and often forgotten during peacetime, is how U.S. installations in Japan 
support the many war plans and contingencies that may arise in the region.  This is what I 
call the “blind spot” that fails to receive consideration when analysts and government  
assigned as such to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from 1993 to 1997.  As a civilian, he is an Executive 
Director of Morgan Stanley-Tokyo. 
193 Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, 
 Department of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 1. 
194 U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. Transcript: “Baker Thanks Okinawans for Their Friendship and Support,” 
May 19, 2002. U.S. Embassy, Tokyo Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/amb/tamb-0026.html; Internet; accessed 10 July 2004.  
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officials search for ways to better package the security alliance.  Finding a force structure 
which projects an effective force capable of accomplishing a myriad of tasks in 
accordance with the security alliance while addressing evolving community concerns 
during peacetime, is not a task which can be approached in a tacit manner.  A senior 
Marine official pointed out that peacetime operational tempo bears no resemblance to 
wartime or contingency requirements.  Along these lines, there is little, in terms of force 
structure, to remove from Japan, specifically Okinawa and the Marines based there.  The 
political reality of Okinawa makes this especially difficult and a factor which may 
undermine the U.S. deterrent posture in Asia should the strategic importance of Okinawa 
be brushed aside.  In the words of an anonymous senior U.S. military official: 
…there are no pieces to give up on Okinawa.  There is no “fat” in III MEF 
force structure or any other service organizations on Okinawa.  III MEF is 
less than half the size of the other two Marine expeditionary forces.  Still, 
the Marines on Okinawa are the only general purpose forces forward-
based in the region that are available to project power or respond to any 
event on short notice throughout the region.195   
In short, we must look at the entire picture of the issues this thesis is attempting to assess, 
and not forget to look at a very important piece—the “blind spot” or wartime 
requirements. 
C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent variables which may influence this process are actual Japanese 
Constitutional reinterpretation or revision, Korean unification, or both, sooner rather than 
later.  The outcome of the November 2004 U.S. Presidential elections and a subsequent 
halt or reversal of the DoD bottom-up review and transformation of military forces was 
another independent variable.  Other independent variables are: 
• Internal turmoil in China and a downturn in the Chinese economy. 
• Another major incident between the United States and Japan such as the 
February 9, 2001 collision between the U.S. Navy’s nuclear attack 
submarine, USS Greenville with the Japanese fishing boat the Ehime 
Maru near Hawaii. 
 
195 Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with author via e-mail correspondence from 
Monterey, California on 4-5 June 2004. 
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• Japanese overreaction to the killing of Japanese troops in Iraq and 
potential misperception of a remilitarized Japan.196 
• Costs associated with transformation in the United States and in Japan 
towards packaging the optimal force and security alliance for the future 
may be too expensive for Japan’s sluggish economy.  Japan’s 15 year 
recession has taken a toll on defense spending as evidenced in Japan’s 
procurement of front-line equipment which has steadily dropped for over a 
decade,197  (see Appendix D).  Japan Facilities Improvement Program 
(JFIP) which contributes nearly $1 billion annually towards the 
maintenance and construction of facilities on U.S. bases in Japan has been 
redefined with limits in order to save GOJ funds198  and has dropped 
slightly between FY 2002 and FY 2003.199 As Japan pursues missile 
defense (MD) technology with a laggard economy, it may be constrained 
to adopt radical adjustments to the current force structure and facilities of 
U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan.  
• Negative local reaction to increased military presence in mainland Japan. 
It is no secret that mainland Japanese have been accused by Okinawans 
that they have a case of “not-in-my-back-yardism,” or “NIMBY.”  
Lieutenant Colonel Duke explains, “GOJ acknowledges the need to 
relocate some forces from Okinawa to mainland Japan and even to realign 
some U.S. forces in mainland Japan elsewhere in Japan; however, GOJ is 
reticent to pursue them because of the significant push back that would 
take place from the local communities.”200  
 
196 Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, Military Attaché, Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC, interview 12 May 
2004, stated that the Japanese public has reacted favorably after witnessing how well Japanese troops have 
been received in Iraq and pointed out that their role and limited success thus far is indicative of a 
transformed Japanese “military” and should quell concerns of a potential return to an aggressive military 
such as it was pre-1945.  It should be noted however, Japanese troops did not operate in the Middle East 
prior to 1945 and there are no World War II memories of Imperial Japanese Forces in the Middle East as 
there is in Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
197 Defense Program for FY 2003: An Overview, Defense Agency, Japan. 
198 In 2000 a provision in a Special Measures Agreement is that Japanese Facilities Improvement 
Program (JFIP) funds can no longer be used for “revenue producing” projects. Examples of projects 
disallowed in the FY01 program were Army and Air Force Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, 
commissaries, and gymnasiums. The effect of this provision is that additional military construction 
(MILCON) funding will be required for the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force 
Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DoD Schools to support Quality of 
Life initiatives for U.S. service members in Japan.  Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before The Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 
Posture Statement, 27 March 2001.   
199 Defense of Japan 2003, 438.  
200 Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, 
interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004.  There has been regular reporting in the Japanese 
media on the reaction of local communities in mainland Japan to the unofficial proposals made by the U.S. 
side during the DPRI process.  See, Shinichi Cho, Norio Oyama, and Hideyo Suzuki, “Rising Opposition 
from Municipalities Designated as Proposed Relocation Sites in Line with U.S. Force Transformation; 
Government May Ask U.S. to Reconsider.” Mainichi, (Tokyo) 29 July, 2004, and The Japan Times, “U.S. 
Proposes Moving Some Troops to Hokkaido.” The Japan Times Online [home page on-line]; available 
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D. ACTIONABLE OPTIONS 
1. Status Quo  
The proponents of the status quo are found within the official positions of both 
governments at the time being.  Various mainstream media outlets in Japan report the 
announcements of key GOJ officials, such as former Foreign Minister Yoriko 
Kawaguchi, who stated that there is every intention to pursue and complete the agreed 
terms of the 1996 SACO.201  The U.S. government officially asserts this position also but 
displays more flexibility to pursue broader changes with U.S. force structure in Japan and 
changing roles for the JSDF.  Deputy Secretary of State Armitage stated, “at present, 
there is no change in our position to observe the [SACO] agreement.”202
The status quo is the safe position for both governments to take until the DPRI 
process can find a better way ahead.  Both governments agree that changes to the security 
agreement are in order and both sides have many ideas but both sides cannot agree on the 
way ahead.  Mr. Yamaji points out an example of this in regards to changes in the SOFA.  
Mr. Yamaji stated that both governments wish to make changes in the implementation of 
the current SOFA; however, the changes are so different and far apart that both 
governments cannot come to agreement and therefore maintain the status quo.    
Along with completing the 27 initiatives of the 1996 SACO Final Report, DoD 
has been pursuing Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) and Memorandums of Agreement 
(MOA) in Southeast Asia and reintroducing military forces into Guam.  The Marine 
Corps’ General James Jones, Commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) and U.S. European Command, asserts that the United States should 
adopt smaller, less expensive basing throughout the world dubbed the “lily pad” 
concept.203  The trend of adopting VFA’s and  “lily pads” in Southeast Asia could evolve 
with USFJ acting as a regional hub of operations.  In sum, maintaining the status quo is 
predicated on waiting to see how key issues such as Korean unification and Japanese 
 
from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040608a1.htm; Internet; accessed 8 June 
2004.  
201 Asahi (Tokyo), 21 February 2004. 
202 Tokyo Shimbun (Tokyo), 11 March 2004 in Kyodo News (Washington), 10 March 2004.  
203 This concept is not new but the softer language of calling the concept “lily pads” is a better 
approach than something along the lines of “police boxes” which lends to the perception that the United 
States is the global policeman.   
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Constitutional reinterpretation or revision actually unfold; a de facto wait and see position 
(see Appendix E).   
2. Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI) 204                    
This model precisely addresses the premises I arrived at in this study (see 
Appendix F).  The following are detailed dependent variables which should not require a 
revised treaty.205  The 1996 SACO Final Report was an agreement which offers 
flexibility which a treaty does not.  The Security Alliance Transformation Initiative 
(SATI) could be the result of the DPRI process and since it is not a total revision of the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and 
Japan, it could be as flexible as the 1996 SACO Final Report.   
a. SATI’s Dependent Variables 
  (1)  Land Return and Consolidation. The report titled, The 
Technical Assessment of the Feasibility of Relocating the Operational Capability of 
MCAS Futenma to Kadena Air Base Proper conducted on July 29, 1996 by the Director 
of Operations (J3), USFJ must be restudied by an agency outside of the Department of 
Defense.  An objective study by an impartial entity must be conducted in order to ensure 
the study is not conducted on a defensive footing.  The study should be anchored on a 
positive approach towards assessing on how the task of integrating air operations of the 
Air Force and Marine Corps in Okinawa onto Kadena Air Base can be done, and 
evolving the base into a genuine joint U.S. base with the future possibility of inviting 
JSDF units onto the huge installation also.  This should be a study which is shared by the 
United States and Japan and should consider the additional feasibility of shifting some 
18th Wing functions from Kadena Air Base to Yokota Air Base.   
                                                 
204 The acronym S.A.T.I  in this precise spelling has no meaning in Japanese.  The syllable TI; 
however, is pronounced and recognized as chi in Japanese, consequently SACHI(TI) means happiness in 
Japanese. 
205 Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps 
explained during an interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004, that the 1996 SACO Final Report 
was a report that outlined recommendations for realigning forces on Okinawa and measures to reduce the 
impact of the U.S. military on Okinawa which both countries agreed to adopt. 
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  The tone of the 1996 study was generally incredulous, but it did 
acknowledge the possibility of shifting certain air operations to nearby Ie Island206 which 
will limit some of the excess air traffic.  The report also confirmed available acreage for 
“absorbing the rotary wing functions from MCAS Futenma to Kadena AB” and also for 
“the projected future capability of the [Marine Corps’] MV-22.”  The use of the large 
runaway on Ie Island should not be dismissed due to its austere environment but 
embraced as an opportunity for economic revitalization.  The 1996 study however, failed 
to address that a consolidation of MCAS Futenma into Kadena Air Base would actually 
enhance certain operations such as aircraft ordnance upload and download.  It has been 
standard procedure for Marine aircraft from MCAS Futenma to conduct all ordnance 
uploading and downloading at Kadena Air Base and as a result, must fly from MCAS 
Futenma to Kadena Air Base to pick-up ordnance and then fly to the training ranges.  
Consolidation would eliminate a certain amount of air traffic required for that task along 
with other logistical requirements and conceivably, enhance ordnance operations during 
contingencies.    
Restudying the integration is imperative considering the 2001 
QDR and the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Kadena Air Base207 is based on 
a Cold War-era base model and, as the Air Force transforms itself towards becoming 
more capabilities-based, so should efforts for a new and clean look at its bases in Japan 
be taken, specifically Kadena Air Base.  A stellar paradigm for the future of Kadena Air 
Base and other U.S. bases overseas is Misawa Air Base, located in Aomori Prefecture, in 
northern Japan.  Misawa Air Base is a joint, bilateral installation with all four U.S. 
services stationed there along with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.  Misawa Air Base 
is also home to the Misawa Airport, which runs Japan Air System, a civilian airline 
 
206 Ie Island is located off the northwest coast of Okinawa and the Marine Corps operates a sizeable 
airfield and range (Ie Shima Training Facility) for a variety of training operations.  Operational Support 
Detachment (OSD), Ie Shima is a 13-man unit which maintains the airfield and ranges which consists of 
over 800 acre range, 5,000 foot unimproved coral runway, 1,200 foot V/STOL runway, 1,100m x 700m 
parachute drop zone and other  training resources.  Source:  Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, 
AC/S G-3, OSD fact sheet of July 2000.   
207 Kadena Air Base is the largest U.S. military installation in the Asia-Pacific region and the largest 
wing in the Air Force. See Kadena Air Base. Kadena Air Base Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www-02.kadena.af.mil/18wg/18wg/staff/18wgpa/PAWeb/facts.htm; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004. 
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which has four daily flights out of Misawa.208   At the time of this writing, there is a U.S. 
Navy tenant command and limited Marine Corps operations on Kadena Air Base, 
supported by a small detachment, Marine Wing Liaison Kadena (MWLK).  These 
operations are important but are small in scale and not what the base could evolve into 
considering the wide range of operations conducted at Misawa Air Base, a much smaller 
installation.  Conducting a fresh non-partisan study, sanctioned by the governments of 
Japan and the United States will de facto suspend the completion of the 1996 SACO 
Final Report in regards to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan in Henoko.   
As the original 1996 SACO Final Report is on schedule for 
completion by 2008, except for the issue of MCAS Futenma, the completion of an 
updated and favorable study of the integration of MCAS Futenma209  into Kadena Air 
Base could be the impetus of a potential second round of SACO or the Security Alliance 
Transformation Initiative (SATI). 210  A second round of SACO or SATI should not be 
limited to Okinawa but should consider all of USFJ.  SATI, embraced by both GOJ and 
USG could serve as a strategic way ahead and the result of the DPRI which synergizes 
the transformation efforts of both nations’ armed forces in accordance with the existing 
security treaty.   
  (2)  Camp Kinser, Okinawa.  Whether MCAS Futenma integrates 
into Kadena Air Base or relocates to Henoko, Okinawans will shift there attention to 
another Marine Corps installation perched on a prime piece of real-estate on the outskirts 
                                                 
208 James L. Bressendorff, First Lieutenant, USAF, Public Affairs Officer, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa 
Air Base, Japan , in an e-mail interview by author on 28 April 2004. 
209 According to Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters 
Marine Corps, Washington, DC, in an interview by author on 13 May 2004, there has been discussions 
about moving the flight operations from MCAS Futenma elsewhere as an interim solution for meeting 
Ginowan city concerns regarding noise and safety at MCAS Futenma while at the same time, not fully 
returning the installation, until a replacement facility can be built.  Essentially maintain it as a UN base in 
“warm” status until the replacement facility can be built and the UN flag shifted. (The concept of just 
maintaining a base is called a “warm base”). Until a replacement facility can be built this will enable 
PACOM to maintain an operational airfield capability should they need it in a contingency.  In my view, 
this option poses risks and challenges in Okinawa because once a precedence is set anywhere in Japan, 
especially Okinawa,  it is near impossible to reverse it, such as the 1995 halt to artillery firing on Okinawa 
and numerous provisions contained within the SOFA which have not been exercised by the U.S. in many 
years.  Clear definitions of contingencies and open communication will be required should this option be 
pursued.       
210 Professor Edward A. Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, advised 
against calling this process “SACO II” since the term may be looked upon unfavorably because it suggests 
creating a new process when the original process (1996 SACO) is not finished. 
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of Shin Naha (New Naha)-- Camp Kinser.  Third to Kadena Air Base and MCAS 
Futenma, Camp Kinser is the installation most Okinawans would like to see returned211 
as it is the most prominent U.S. facility in the heavily congested southern part of 
Okinawa.   Camp Kinser’s major tenant command is the Marine Corps’ headquarters of 
3d Force Service Support Group (3d FSSG) and contains numerous facilities 
warehousing warfighting supplies for III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and 
other tenant commands such as the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO), 
headquarters offices for the Defense Commissary Agency  (DeCA) branch in Okinawa, 
warehouses for the Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), and other smaller 
activities.  The leitmotif here is the DoD transformation, and the sea-basing concept the 
Navy and Marine Corps are continually pursuing.  The U.S. Navy’s strategic vision, Sea 
Power 21, is the Navy’s bid to transform itself into projecting decisive joint capabilities.  
The concept of sea basing is one of the three required capabilities in achieving 
transformation in the Navy and one which is intimately linked to the Marine Corps’ 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept.  The emerging sea basing concept 
includes:  
…providing joint force commanders with global command and control 
and extending integrated logistical support to other services.  More than a 
family of platforms afloat, sea basing will network platforms together and 
promote interoperability among the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), 
the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), the Combat Logistics Force, 
and emerging high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies.212   
As these concepts are evolving and developing technology to support them, a close 
examination should be conducted on placing the combat logistical power of 3d FSSG on 
ships, such as high-speed vessels ported at White Beach.  This will call for the expansion 
of White Beach.  Other facilities which cannot be embarked on ship should be moved to 
Camp Hansen where space will be afforded in the void of the Marine artillery regiment 
and where a significant portion of III MEF units, which 3d FSSG supports, reside and 
maintain their equipment.  Family housing and related facilities will need to be expanded 
in the northern areas of Okinawa if all of Camp Kinser is returned.   
 
211 Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, Department 
of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 16. 
212 Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003, 8. 
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An enormous side benefit for returning Camp Kinser and 
relocating vehicle maintenance units to the northern installation of Camp Hansen, is the 
decrease of the uneasy spectacle of large military vehicle convoys on the small congested 
roads of southern Okinawa.  This effort will greatly diminish the risk of accidents which 
has plagued motorists on Okinawa for years, as young service members drive large 
American built vehicles on unfamiliar pavement and on the opposite side of the road.   
  (3)  Marine Troop Relocation and Reduction from Okinawa.   
Along with the current study of relocating a Marine artillery 
regiment from Okinawa to Camp Fuji, the headquarters elements of the Marine artillery 
regiment should be relocated to Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, where housing and 
facilities exist and can be expanded for families and is in close proximity to Camp Fuji. 
In addition, to moving the Marine artillery regiment to Camp Fuji, 
I propose that one of the Marine Corps infantry unit deployment program (UDP) 
battalions also be relocated to Camp Fuji where land exists for expansion of facilities and 
infrastructure.  Training opportunities are limited on Okinawa due to the 1997 halt to 
artillery firing on Okinawa and land return in accordance with the 1996 SACO and the 
adherence to a “sensitive days” calendar,213 (see Appendix G).  In 2000, III MEF 
participated in 77 training events of which 74 occurred off Okinawa.214   Some of these 
training events occurred on Camp Fuji where restrictions and limits to training also exist.  
The point is that there are limits to training everywhere in Japan and the best training 
opportunities are found in bilateral or multilateral exercises throughout East Asia.  The 
stationing of an infantry battalion at Camp Fuji should not erode readiness and the 
viability to expand the existing runway at Camp Fuji to be able to handle troop transport 
planes, such as a C-130, should also be considered.  Additionally, by moving troops to 
Camp Fuji, they are only a few hours away by ground transportation from existing troop 
transport capabilities at Yokosuka Naval Base and Yokota Air Base. 
                                                 
213 The “sensitive days” calendar serves to bracket acceptable days of the year for training on Marine 
installations in Japan with consideration given to the local community so that military training is conducted 
on days which will not be disrespectful or an affront to Japanese/Okinawan holidays, anniversaries, and 
other politically or culturally sensitive days.   
214 Earl B. Hailston, Lieutenant General, USMC (Retired) , former Commanding General III MEF in 
an 11 May 2001 briefing at Headquarters III MEF, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan.  
88 
A future alternative from moving one infantry UDP battalion to 
Camp Fuji is keeping one infantry UDP battalion at its home station in Hawaii.  This will 
leave three infantry UDP battalions on Okinawa, one of which is assigned to the 31st 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU).  When a full brigade of Marines, 3d Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB), is to be assembled, the remaining two infantry UDP 
battalions on Okinawa could constitute itself with the infantry battalion from Hawaii 
wherever needed and form as a brigade with the remaining elements of the brigade’s 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  This option may become more feasible once 
the Sea Basing concept is realized and matures and deserves a separate study to fully 
address the risks, political implications, and available strategic lift which is already is 
short supply.     
The two immediate preceding options address a demand which is 
gaining more attention than land return215 in post-1996 SACO, which is to “lessen the 
burden” by relocating troops off Okinawa.   Considering moving one of the infantry UDP 
battalions along with moving a Marine artillery regiment will considerably lighten the 
“footprint” on Okinawa.      
(4) Best neighbors, not just good neighbors (Community Buy-In). 
Current initiatives which should be sustained are efforts to create more “buy-in” 
towards the community from young service members and military families living in 
Okinawa and the rest of Japan.  Through my observations and experience as a military 
policeman, there are higher occurrences of incidents involving younger (18-20 year old) 
male, service members who are stationed on Okinawa without their families and for less 
than a year.  On  September 19, 2003, Headquarters Marine Corps released a new policy 
aimed at sustaining operational readiness but carried the by-product of creating an 
environment where Marines had the time to get to know the community they live in and 
become a more responsible member of that community.  Specifically, the policy was 
changed to create greater continuity, unit stability and individual maturity, cultural 
knowledge and familiarity with local and regional military forces, governments and 
private citizens, and to improve knowledge of continuing operational requirements.  
Marine Administrative message 529/2003, III MEF and MCBJ Assignment Policy,                                                  
215 Land return and consolidation must be careful not to create traffic problems on Okinawan’s narrow 
and already congested roads. 
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announced the Marine Corps will begin the transition in FY-2004 to the DoD standard216 
for permanent change of station (PCS) assignments to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, 
which are 36-month tours for those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours 
for those who are not accompanied by family members.217
(5)  Environmental Concerns.  Another noteworthy and maturing 
effort is evident with respect to the environment.  The Marine Corps remains pro-active 
by using the latest technology to address environmental concerns.  The Marine Corps 
maintains a full-time environmental staff on Okinawa to address a myriad of issues, such 
as the effects of range fires to rectifying past disposal practices dating back to the 
immediate post-World War II years with the discovery of chemical irritants and barrels 
buried with hazardous material by the U.S. Army.  The most salient environmental 
concern which must continue to be addressed is soil erosion, commonly referred to as 
akatsuchi or “red-soil runoff.”  According to Okinawa Prefecture’s 2001 “Annual Red 
Soil Outflow Amount Survey,” only eight percent of the island’s red soil erosion comes 
from U.S. bases, a decrease of more than 27% since 1998.  Red-soil runoff from Marine 
Corps training ranges is a concern which is being addressed with success by the Marine 
Corps with intense aerial-hydroseeding and other re-vegetation efforts such as the 
planting of Wedelia plants.  According to Larry Soenen, soil scientist with the U.S. Forest 
Service, “…the Wedelia plant is very durable and fire resistant.  This plant can stand up 
to the shooting Marines need to do on the ranges.”218  
  (6)  U.S. Funded Jobs.  All of USFJ should take note of the 
example Marines have set as they civilianize positions in accordance with the 
transformation.  In keeping with specific guidance from Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfield, the Marines have made great strides towards taking Marines out of garrison 
service and support roles and returning them to combat related duties.  Seeing an 
                                                 
216 DoD directive 1315.7 directs that the standard overseas tour will be 36 or 24 months for locations 
with quality-of-life reasonably comparable to U.S. standards.
217USMC. “MARADMIN 529/03, III MEF and MCBJ Assignment Policy,”  USMC Online 
 [home page on-line]; available from  http://www.usmc.mil/maradmins/maradmin2000.nsf/d50a617f5ac 
75ae085256856004f3afc/265fddd4be13b6e085256de30059b048?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,529; 
Internet; accessed 12 August 2004. 
218T. J. Kaemmerer, Marine Corps News, “Hydroseeding heals quickly,” Marine Corps News Online 
[home page on-line]; available from http://www.okinawa.usmc.mil/Public%20Affairs%20Info/Archive% 
20News%20Pages/2004/040319-hydroseeding.html ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2004.  
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opportunity to contribute an economic boost to local communities in Okinawa, the 
Marine Corps turned these jobs which Marines once did into permanent civilian positions 
fully funded by the Marine Corps. Since 2001, the Marine Corps has provided an 
additional 357 full-time positions as bus drivers and cooks in support of Marines on 
Okinawa.219 As a bonus, the Marine Corps was able to return a battalion-size amount of 
Marines back into the combat-related roles they were originally intended for.   As of 
March 2004, GOJ employed 8,813 Japanese nationals as base employees throughout all 
U.S. military bases on Okinawa.  It is important to note that even 357 jobs are significant 
and appreciated, especially when funded by the United States and expansion of the 
Master Labor Contract (MLC)220 by GOJ is not feasible during a sluggish Japanese 
economy.  In Japanese fiscal year 2003, 15,582 Japanese nationals applied for 675 jobs 
on U.S. military bases on Okinawa and of those, all 675 were hired into full-time 
positions.221  Continuing along this trend should be fully pursued and studied in 
accordance with DoD’s Business Reform Initiative (BRI) and the overall transformation. 
  (7)  Public Affairs.  Of utmost importance is the need for a 
different approach towards  public affairs and the acceptance that our efforts should not 
be only to inform the American military community but that of our surrounding local 
communities in accordance with a sincere approach towards being a great neighbor.  
There are many outlets on U.S. military bases to keep English speaking people informed; 
however, the surrounding communities of U.S. military bases in Japan are dependent on 
their local media sources, which are more often biased against the U.S. military and do 
not offer the whole story or counter-balancing stories to issues and events.  Brigadier 
General Larsen began to address this gap towards keeping the local communities 
informed by starting the publication of a bilingual, quarterly magazine called Okina Wa, 
or “Big Circle,” in 2002.  Funding is small and distribution is limited to a small portion of 
the population of key Japanese officials and civic leaders.  Perhaps expanding this 
initiative with the Japanese Self-Defense Force and other U.S. military forces on 
                                                 
219 Statistics provided by Larry Brantley, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, Marine Corps Base, 
Camp Smedley D. Butler during an e-mail interview by author, Monterey, California, 20 April 2004. 
220 The Master Labor Contract (MLC) is an agreement between GOJ and USG regarding the 
employment of GOJ funded Japanese national employees for U.S. military bases in Japan.  USFJ reports a 
total of  23,500 Japanese employees on U.S. military bases throughout all of Japan, including Okinawa. 
221 Okinawa Times (Naha), 20 April 2004. 
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Okinawa could provide the funding and readership for a monthly publication.  Other 
recommendations to increase outreach and readership/viewership are as follows: 
• Make base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Japanese base employees 
and their families informed, this will spill over into other sectors of the 
local community who will find interest in being able to read U.S. base 
newspapers.222 
• Make all U.S. military websites in Japan bilingual.  Much progress has 
already been made towards this effort in 2004. On July 12, 2004, USFJ 
reported a Japanese-language version of the USFJ website located at 
http://usfj.mil/j_index.html. Prior to this announcement, Marine Forces 
Japan and Naval Forces Japan launched Japanese-language versions of 
their websites, http://www.kanji.okinawa.usmc.mil/, and 
http://www.kanji.cnfj.navy.mil respectively.  This effort should be 
sustained and further developed with all branches of the U.S. Armed 
Forces in Japan.  Japanese who are interested in hearing from the U.S. side 
on various issues can now find an official U.S. website in Japanese.  This 
is important as these websites will counter the unofficial and biased, anti-
military websites which have proliferated in Japan.  Many of the unofficial 
websites are rumor-type of sites which perpetuate sensational reports as 
facts.  Furthermore, there are unofficial websites established by Japanese 
base workers who are frustrated at the lack of official U.S. news media, in 
Japanese, countering the biased reports of Japanese media and websites, 
such as, http//home.interlink.or.jp/~mabe/ . 
• Consider having a Japanese speaking announcer on the Okinawa-based 
Armed Forces Network (AFN) FM radio station 89.1.  Having segments in 
complete Japanese is not practical, but having a bilingual announcer who 
is able to repeat news such as events and incidents in Japanese will be of 
great benefit since the radio station is frequently listened to by Okinawans 
for its Western music.223  
Mr. Funakoshi gave encouraging comments on other existing 
community relations initiatives mainly from the U.S. Marines on Okinawa which should 
                                                 
222 DoD should examine Pacific Stars and Stripes’ mission and enforce high and ethical standards of 
reporting in Japan and avoid tabloid style reporting in order to call attention to itself as a relevant 
newspaper.  Pacific Stars and Stripes has been known to report on unsubstantiated and uncollaborated data 
which communicated incorrect and false information to base communities and surrounding local 
communities. 
223 According to Marine Gunnery Sergeant G.T. Fontana, Station Manger for Det. 11, American 
Forces Network (AFN) Okinawa, in an e-mail interview 23 May 2004, there is no official polling data on 
the exact number of Japanese listeners; however, 400,000 (estimate) out of Okinawa’s 1.3 million 
population live within the transmitting signal of AFN Okinawa and are considered the “shadow audience.”  
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continue, such as the English teaching program in schools and the prospects for 
expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups.224   
  (8)  Cultural Training.  Finally regarding community relations, the 
cultural training of Marines reporting for duty on Okinawa may be flawed.  Depending 
how a Marine is assigned to Okinawa determines how they receive cultural training.  
Marines who report to Okinawa with their family on an accompanied225 tour will spend a 
full day in a newcomer’s orientation.  Marines who deploy to Okinawa with their units 
for a typical six-month period on the unit deployment program will receive briefs in a 
pre-deployment training package before leaving their home base in the United States and 
then again upon arrival by local authorities such as military police and community 
relations liaisons.  Marines who report to Okinawa individually for a one-year 
unaccompanied226 tour will receive a series of briefs within a one-week span while 
temporarily assigned to the Joint Reception Center (JRC) on Okinawa until they are 
delivered to their permanent units.   It is estimated that between 9,500-10,000 personnel 
transit through the JRC annually.227 It is my assertion that cultural training is not as 
effective as it could be in this third group of Marines and sailors which is mainly 
composed of young (18-20 year-old) and low ranking personnel on their first assignment 
in the military.  Most of these Marines and sailors are jet-lagged and what they retain is a 
basic fear of making a mistake and not wanting to venture off-base.  These fears are 
quickly dispelled as soon as they make relationships with Marines who have been on 
Okinawa for a while.  Since the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force and frequently 
deploys its personnel overseas it should consider institutionalizing a similar period of 
instruction (POI) used by Marine Security Guard (MSG) School in Quantico, Virginia for 
instructing their Marines on cultural sensitivities associated with overseas assignment in a 
diplomatic environment.  Institutionalizing a similar POI in recruit training along with 
existing pre-deployment training may create a foundation upon which Marines can 
                                                 
224 Other initiatives are the hosting of base open-houses (festivals) and Special Olympics hosted by 
the U.S. Air Force on Kadena Air Base.    
225 Accompanied tour implies a command-sponsored,  three-year assignment with family. 
226 Unaccompanied tour implies a  one-year assignment without command-sponsorship for family. 
227 Michael F. Jackson, CWO4, USMC, Personnel Officer, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. 
Butler,  Okinawa, Japan, in an e-mail interview with author, 2 June 2004. 
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become better educated and ready to learn specifics about Okinawa, Japan, or any other 
location they are assigned too. 
3. U.S. Department of State 
Efforts from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) outside ordinary diplomatic 
dialogue to implement programs or take actions which could strengthen the security 
alliance and facilitate understanding between the U.S. military and local communities or, 
to counter biased and inflammatory media coverage has been mild.  The U.S. Embassy’s 
staff in Tokyo and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate, Naha, Okinawa have been 
heavily engaged in talks and discussion; however, implementation of programs or ways 
to communicate facts to the local community has been assumed by the U.S. military.   
An example of where the Department of State could exercise their diplomatic 
resources is with the graduate school initiative on Okinawa, known as the Okinawa 
Institute of Science and Technology (OIST).  Although the U.S. military has no official 
role with bringing this international graduate school to Okinawa, GOJ has asked USG for 
support by providing space for the children of the OIST staff to attend the U.S. military’s 
Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) on Okinawa, which the U.S. 
military has agreed to provide on a space available basis and with payment of the 
tuition.228
Sincere concern for Okinawans is exemplified by the leadership and initiative of 
U.S. military commanders.  The Commander of Marine Forces Pacific, Lieutenant 
General W.C. Gregson has provided a contractor, Okinawa Education Initiatives Project 
Coordinator, to assess the possibility to implement two projects linked to OIST.  First, 
was a team-teaching program within the local high schools on Okinawa; the Marine 
Corps has the goal to provide native English speakers to aide the Japanese teachers in 
teaching English. The second project is to establish an international school that will 
provide education for the OIST staff children and local Okinawans.229  These programs 
among others which the Marine Corps and the rest of USFJ have been consistently 
implementing, with goals towards strengthening the alliance and giving something back 
 
228 Kaori Martinez, GS-11, Community Relations Specialist, AC/S G-5, Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Smedley D. Butler, during an e-mail interview on 24 May 2004.  
229 Ibid. 
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to Okinawans in particular, are indicative of the things that the State Department could 
and should consider initiating.   
4. Options for the Japanese to Consider 
As the constitutional debate and the review of the NDPO progresses in Japan, 
Tokyo has already made some plans to transform the JSDF, first, with plans to establish a 
joint headquarters and also with the speculation that the JDA will evolve into a 
ministry.230  Additionally, the Japanese are debating the future roles and missions of the 
JSDF.  I propose that GOJ transform the JSDF into a joint operating task-force with 
expeditionary capabilities to augment U.S. forces in combined/joint task forces.  Bush 
administration officials’ views on the evolution of the JSDF are compared to the Marine 
Corps’ three-block war concept.  General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps 
Commandant between 1995-1999, once termed a "three-block war" as a scenario where 
troops find themselves engaged in a spectrum of operations, from humanitarian missions, 
through peace keeping and peace enforcement-type actions, to full-blown combat-- 
sometimes within the space of three city blocks.  A senior Bush administration official 
asserted that the Japanese will be able to do one of those blocks in the future. 231  
 a. JSDF on U.S. Bases in Japan   
In coordination with the United States, discussion should be initiated for 
establishing training detachments as tenant commands on U.S. bases in Japan.  Having 
Japanese units on U.S. bases in Japan may help by putting more of a Japanese face onto 
the installation and assist the JSDF by providing them with better facilities.  This creates 
the opportunity to make a Japanese officer the Deputy Camp Commander of U.S. 
installations and even use Japanese resources and troops to assist in force protection.  
Colonel Yamaoka believes that this should be pursued and stated that Japanese officers 
could act as a buffer between local community concerns and U.S. military officials.  
Furthermore, Colonel Yamaoka believes that the JSDF should transform its roles and 
missions towards an expeditionary air-ground task force operating with naval forces such 
as the U.S. Marine Corps.  Being collocated with Marine units would be a benefit if that 
 
230 Yamaoka, 12 May 2004. 
231 Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with the author in Washington, DC on 14 
May 2004. 
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is the direction Tokyo wishes to take.   Mr. Yamaji believes there are some dangers in 
this however, due to the JSDF being still politically inexperienced and may be improperly 
influenced by local community leaders.  
 b. JSDF on U.S. Bases in the United States   
Allowing JSDF detachments as tenant commands in the United States at  
the various services’ learning centers may assist the JSDF to professionalize itself into a 
more joint and capable force.  Precedence with foreign militaries in the United States has 
already been established with the introduction of German Air Forces in Holloman Air 
Force Base, Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1996. 232 Mr. Yamaji stated that allowing 
Japanese forces, with a SOFA, may be the start to making the alliance more reciprocal.233  
Having Japanese detachments on military bases within the U.S. may create opportunities 
for U.S. forces to learn from them also, beginning with cultural issues and martial arts.   
c. Economic Development  
Hiroshi Kitamura said it best 33 years ago: 
…the Japanese should try to reduce the amount of attention directed 
toward the United States to a level proportionate to the reality of each 
problem… Japanese attention to any problem involving the United States 
is generally so high and so overplayed by the Japanese press that political 
and economic circles cannot handle problems with due consideration for 
their actual importance on a scale of national interest.234    
A 2001 poll reports that the economy is of equal concern with the U.S. military base issue 
in Okinawa235 and higher in the rest of Japan.   Interestingly, in a recent poll conducted 
 
232 On 1 May 1996, the German Air Force Tactical Training Center was established in concept with 
the 20th Fighter Squadron which provides aircrew training in the F-4F Phantom II.   The TTC serves as the 
parent command for two German air crew training squadrons. The F-4 Training Squadron oversees all 
German F-4 student personal affairs, and provides German instructor pilots to cooperate in the contracted 
F-4 training program provided by the U.S. Air Force (20th Fighter Squadron).  A second TTC unit, the 
Tornado Training Squadron, provides academic and tactical flying training, by German Air Force 
instructors, for German Tornado aircrews. The first contingent of Tornado aircraft arrived at Holloman in 
March 1996. More than 300 German Air Force members are permanently assigned at Holloman to the 
TTC--the only unit of its kind in the United States. The German Air Force Flying Training Center activated 
March 31, 1996. Holloman AFB, “Holloman AFB History,” Holloman AFB Online [home page on-line]; 
available from http://www.holloman.af.mil/hafb/basehistory.html; Internet; accessed 23 May 2004.  
233 Yamaji, 12 May 2004. 
234 Kitamura, 37. 
235 Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, 
 Department of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 1. 
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by the University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun the issue of U.S. military bases did 
not register as an important issue or concern (see Table 5).   
 
Table 5. Poll Representing the Most Important Issues Facing the Japanese Today 
 
Question: Aside from whether you are for or against, pick as many issues as you think 
are important from among the following 13 items. 
Japan should build up its defense capability 248 
Japan should reinforce its security alliance with the 
U.S. 
119 
Japan should not hesitate to strike first if and when an 
armed attack is predicted 
162 
Japan should play its international role as a permanent 
member of the U.N. Security Council 
175 
Japan should dispatch SDF personnel to help with 
Iraq's reconstruction 
234 
It would be better to downsize the government even 
though its services, such as social welfare, may 
deteriorate 
122 
Japanese companies should retain lifetime 
employment 
139 
Job security with public works is needed for local 
districts 
155 
For the time being, the government should increase 
public spending to stimulate the economy instead of 
curtailing budget appropriations for a fiscal 
turnaround 
244 
The government should raise the consumption tax rate 
for its sustainable pension systems 
434 
The government should privatize its 3 postal services 190 
The government should stop building new highways 
and the existing highways should be toll free 
228 
Voting rights should be granted to foreign nationals 
with permanent residency status 
92 
 
From: The survey was conducted by the University of Tokyo and the Asahi  
Shimbun on a face-to-face basis to follow up 1,978 effective respondents  
among 3,000 persons who were sampled out of the nation's voting population  
on a stratified two-stage random-sampling basis for a previous survey conducted  
September 15-16, 2003.  A questionnaire form was mailed to them between  
November 8 and 9, 2003 and answers were obtained from 1,233 persons  
(62.3 percent).  All 1,233 respondents did not necessarily answer all questions.   
The total percentage does not reach 100% due to rounding. 
 
Tokyo has made token periodic and seasonal concessions to Okinawa in 
the form of hosting the 2000 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit on Okinawa, lowering 
expressway tolls, and promoting the tourism industry in Okinawa, which is at the mercy 
of seasonal typhoons.  In April 2002, Tokyo passed the Okinawa Promotional Special 
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Measures Law which allowed for the creation of a Special Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) on 
Okinawa, the only free trade zone in Japan.  The purpose of the SFTZ is “to encourage 
business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade.”236 The 
incentives and subsides available for enterprises who would partake in the SFTZ are 
attractive but, limited partly due to space and restrictions to types of business. This 
initiative is on the right track but has yet to draw large-scale international interest.  
Perhaps, expanding the actual free trade zone to other areas on Okinawa and better 
international advertising and promotion of other laws and programs, such as the Okinawa 
Industrial Location Promotion Act,237 designated at attracting foreign investment, may 
prove beneficial.  
The Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, the 
Okinawa Policy Council, the Okinawa General Bureau,238 and the Okinawa Prefectural 
Government should consider promoting an industry base in Okinawa capitalizing on the 
indigenous talent there such as glass making and textiles.  In addition for researching and 
planning for the future graduate school-OIST, a debate and study should be considered 
for promoting an international karate and sports academy on Okinawa, possibly in 
partnership with the JSDF and USFJ.  An international karate and sports academy could 
be attractive towards Japanese Olympic training and future venues should the Olympics 
go to Japan in the future.  Perhaps introducing casinos to Okinawa will generate steady 





236 OPG. “Business,” OPG Online  [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/english/business/images/english.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 July 2004, 7. 
237 The Okinawa Industrial Location Promotion Act, Factory Location Law (designates potential 
industrial sites on Okinawa which offers preferential tax treatment), and the Okinawa Prefectural 
Ordinance for the Promotion of Industrial Sites Act qualifies for  national and offers prefectural subsides 
and financing for industrial factories and enterprises in manufacturing, overland freight transport, 
warehousing, packing, wholesale, software, data processing services, information services, designing, and 
natural science research institutions in Okinawa Prefecture.    
238 The Okinawa General Bureau was established as a general branch office of the national 
government.  It carries out the local work of the regional offices of ministries and agencies including the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.  See, CAO, “Policies on Okinawa,” 




This thesis sought to provide policy-prescriptive options for U.S. forces in Japan, 
specifically Okinawa.  In doing so, this thesis illustrated all the processes involved and 
taken by GOJ and the U.S. government and other psychological and cultural issues which 
shape the environment.  This thesis calls for Japan to determine its national direction and 
for Okinawa to define a viable solution in practical terms.  The options suggested offer 
flexibility in light of potential independent variables and are asserted with the goal of 
moving the security alliance towards a more reciprocal relationship. 
While Japan continues to debate constitutional revision, its foreign policy and 
defense continues to be subject to United States approval.  This “back seat” position in 
world affairs handicaps Japan from making an effective drive for permanent membership 
in the UNSC and limits Japan’s ability to deal more independently with regional 
neighbors.  As a result, Japan will continue to be portrayed as not being a “normal 
country” in some circles and its interests marginalized.   
An obvious recommendation from this thesis is for a continued U.S.-Japan 
Security Alliance in one form or another.  The effects of 9/11 and the uncertainty of 
North Korea and China validates a strong security alliance, able to adjust to meet the 
needs of both nations.  This thesis has provided some adjustment options for both nations 
to consider.            
An issue which is not addressed in this thesis but should be addressed in a 
separate future thesis is the reaction of regional neighbors to the change in U.S. force 
structure in Japan should SATI or a variant of SATI be adopted.  Japanese officials are 
pointing at the limited successes they have achieved in Iraq with the JSDF’s overseas 
developmental assistance missions; however, regional critics of a militarily stronger 
Japan will be sure to point out that Japan has never operated in the Middle East prior to 
World War II and as a result, there are no bitter memories or animosities directed towards 




APPENDIX A  POLLING DATA  
Political Parties’ Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution 239
 
A joint questionnaire survey of lawmakers in the House of Representatives, conducted by 
the Yomiuri Shimbun and Professor Jun Iio's office at the National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS), discovered a substantial difference of views between the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, over basic policies.   
 
LDP:  94 percent were in favor of amending Article 9. 
New Komeito:  33 percent in favor of amending Article 9. 
 
In this regard, respondents were asked to answer if they thought the Constitution should 
be amended so that Japan can participate in collective defense.   
 
-As a result, 66 percent of the respondents answered "yes." 
-In the LDP, "yes" reached 90 percent. 
-In the New Komeito, however, three-fourths answered "no." 
 
 
Japanese Public’s Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution 
 
First Sample:  
Sixty-five percent of respondents FAVOR a revision of the Constitution, of this, 52 
percent cite that Japan could not fully contribute to the international community under the current 
Constitution. From: Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 2 April 2004. 
 
Second Sample Grouping:   
 
From: September 2000 and August 2001 from Office of Research, Stretching the Security Consensus 
in Japan, Department of State, Washington, DC, 20 September 2001.  April 2004 from the Yomiuri 
Shimbun poll reported 2 April 2004.  June 2004 from the Tokyo Shimbun poll reported 23 June 2004, of 
this 29.1 percent of the respondents are in favor of revising the constitution to include Article 9; 
however, 48.7 percent are in favor of revising certain parts of the constitution but not Article 9. 
Support For Constitutional Revision Polls   
 Sep 00 Aug 01 Apr 04 Jun 04 
In Favor to Revise the 
Constitution (% in favor) 
 
50% 
   
56% 
   
65% 
   
77.8% 
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APPENDIX B PROCESS OF TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-JAPAN 
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APPENDIX C  CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT 
THREATENING ACTIONS BY THE DPRK 
(Compiled by author, September 2004)  
 
June 1993  DPRK test-launched a Nodong 1 missile into the Sea of Japan 
(Advertised at 600 miles range, but blew at exactly 300 miles). 
Basically, Nodong 1 was a SCUD missile modified with more 
engines for greater range making it a medium-range missile.  
Experts not sure whether the precise targeting of the missile was 
accidental or an indication of the North’s technological advances. 
 
1993-1994 DPRK is discovered to have been using a Soviet-provided power  
reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making plutonium for 
nuclear weapons and brings the United States and the DPRK to a 
 new level of tension.  The creation of the Agreed Framework 
 diffuses the situation.   
 
April 1996  DPRK soldiers invaded the Panmunjom Joint Security Area. 
 
September 1996 Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK 
territorial waters.  
  
July 1997  DPRK soldiers crossed the DMZ and fired at ROK forces. 
 
June 1998 Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK 
territorial waters. 
 
August 1998  DPRK test-launched a Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan and 
into the Pacific Ocean. 
 
December 1998 ROK forces sank a North Korean submarine that had intruded into 
ROK’s southern waters. 
 
March 1999  Two suspicious boats presumed to be North Korea spy ships 
located off of Japan’s Noto Peninsula.  Warning shots and bombs 
were dropped from a Japanese P-3C airplane. 
 
June 1999 Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats. 
 
21-22 December A suspicious boat observed in waters southwest of Japan’s Kyushu  
2001   Island, suspected of being a North Korean spy ship. 
 
June 2002 Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats. 
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October 2002  Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly confronted Kim  
   Jong-Il’s regime with evidence that the DPRK was violating the  
   1994 Agreed Framework by continuing to enrich uranium.  The  
   DPRK subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
   Treaty (NPT), expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency  
   (IAEA) inspectors, and disabled the IAEA’s monitoring devices  
   and reopened the Yongbyon plant to make plutonium.   
 
October 2002   Five abducted Japanese citizens were permitted a brief visit to  
  Japan and ended up staying, but their family members were left  
  behind and not permitted to reunite by Pyongyang until May 2004. 
 
February 2003  A DPRK MiG-19 transgressed the Northern Limit Line (NLL). 
 
24 February &  DPRK test-launched short-range Rodong missiles. 
10 March 2003 
 
March 2003  Four DPRK fighter aircraft approached a U.S. military aircraft. 
 
July 2003  North and South Korean Troops exchange fire between guard posts 
on the DMZ. 
 
December 2003 The United States intercepted a ship bound for Yemen loaded with  
  North Korean Scud missiles. 
 
August 2004 Reports from Jane’s Defence Weekly that the DPRK has 
developed a land-based, road-mobile and ship or submarine 
launched medium-range ballistic missile by using the Soviet R-27, 
(NATO classification SS-N-6), which was a submarine launched 
ballistic missile.  The land-based model is estimated to have a 
range of 2,500 to 4,000 kilometers and the sea-launched version 
has an estimated range of at least 2,500 kilometers.  The R-27 is a 
single-stage, liquid-propellant, sub-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) that became operational in the Soviet Navy in 1968.  It 
weighs 14,200kg and is 9.65m in length, with a diameter of 1.5m.  
The original version carried a single nuclear re-entry vehicle (RV), 
with a 200kT payload.  These systems have the capability of 
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APPENDIX F SECURITY ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION 
INITIATIVE 














Favorable study will start 
“SATI” 
Return MCAS Futenma and 
move Marine Air Op’s to KAB 
and Ie Shima 
Re-study MCAS Futenma 
merger into KAB and Ie 
Shima 
Move some 18th Wing 
assets to Yokota Air Base 
Move Marine Artillery Regiment to 
Camp Fuji and its HQ to Camp Zama
Return Camp Kinser and 
move 3d FSSG to Camp 
Hansen and on ships 
Community Relations 
Efforts
Japanese tenant commands  
within the United States 
Move Infantry UDP to Camp Fuji or 
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APPENDIX G MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP S.D. BUTLER, 
OKINAWA, JAPAN, SENSITIVE TRAINING DAYS FOR FY 2003 
(From: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler) 
 
  
1.  New Years Holiday 1-3 January Island Wide 
2.  National Center Test for  
University Admissions 
18-19 January (1000-1730) Island Wide 
3.  Lunar New Years Day 1-3 Feb Island Wide 
4.  Examination of Okinawa 
Prefecture University of 
Arts 
3-7 February  (0930-1700) Shuri, Naha City 
5.  Examination of Okinawa 
Women’s Junior College 
5 February (0930-1500) Nagata, Naha City 
6.  Examination of Okinawa 
International University 
6-7 February (0930-1500) Ginowan, Ginowan City 
7.  Examination of Okinawa 
Christian Junior College 
7 February (0900-1700) Onaga, Nishihara Town 
8.  Examination of Okinawa 
University 
9-10 February (0900-1600) Kokuba, Naha 
9. Examination of Meio 
University 
11 February (1300-1600)      Biimata, Nago City 
10.Examination of 
Okinawa Prefecture College 
of Nursing 
25 February (1000-1700) Yogi, Naha City 
11.Examination of 
University Ryukyu 
25-26 February(0830-1700) Senbaru, Nishihara  
12. Examination of 
Okinawa  Prefecture 
University of Arts 
25 February - 1 March 
(0930-1700) 
Shuri, Naha City   
13. Examination of 
Okinawa International 
University 
6 March (0930-1600) Ginowan, Ginowan 
14. Examination of 
Okinawa University 
9 March (0900-1600) Kokuba, Naha City 
15. Examination of 
Okinawa   Women’s Junior 
College 
10 March (0930-1500)    Nagata Naha City 
16. Examination of 
Okinawa Christian Junior 
College 
11 March (0900-1700) Onaga, Nishihara 
17.Examination of 
Prefecture High Schools 
10-11 March (0800-1630) Island Wide 
112 
18. Examination of 
Okinawa   Prefecture 
College of Nursing 
12 March (100-1700) Yogi, Naha City 
19. Examination of 
University Ryukyu 
12-13 March (0900-1830) Senbaru, Town of  Ryukyu 
20. Hamarauri 4-6 April Kin Blue Training 
Area/Gimbaru 
21.Anniversary of 
Reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan 
15 May Island Wide 
22. Memorial Day for War 
Victims 
23 June Island Wide 
23.Examination of Okinawa 
Christian Junior College 
1 August (0900-1700) Onaga, Nishihara Town 
24. Lunar Obon Festival 10-12 August Island Wide 
25. Anniversary of the End 
of the War 
15 August Island Wide  
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